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Federal :Participation in t 11e Control of Industry 
One of the problema of the future will be to 
!determine vrhether industry in the United States shall be 
regulated by gover~ental control or by private initiative and 
I enterprise. 
The irfunedL,te problem is that of presenting a large 
body of concrete information in order that a genuine 
contribution wiy be made to a better underotanding of the events 
~hich have lead toward federal partici~ation in the control of 
\ind,~stry. Because of a lacl<: of authoritative data on this 
l 
!contemporary problem, the classification of material must 
111ecessarily be a broad and arbitrary one. 
1 In the past, federal parti~ipation in the control of 
I 
)industry has been practically nil, howev·er, beca1JSe of 
! 
lcontinJing causes of unrest, the breach between the social· 
~~nders has v;idened until it has become lmperative.that the 
i 
!f-Sovernment should assume the right and the power to direct. 
! 
1:/hether that power will become permanent depends upon the 
\results of the great "experiment" that is being attempted in the 
iJnited .States. It is believed that the people have been 
jJiscipllned by democracy to a self-control sufficient to carry 
eut the great national covenant embodied in the lJational 
---- ----~------~=-======;;;= 
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~ndustrial ~ecovery Act. 
Instead of working as individual units as in the past 
nduatry is to·take co-opera~ive action, with the aid of the 
sOVernment, in order that a national emergency may be overcome. 
The doctrine of individualism, that is, that businef,s 
s a function of purely priv&te initiative without aid of 
~overnmental interference, is of com:paratively recent origin. 
During the period of the Ror.1an Empire there was no 
~uch thing as rug.;ed individualism in industry and business; 
~he state regulated individual initiative and individual 
competition. Roman capitalists were supervised by the State in 
uheir varied enterprises, and a strongly intrenched economic 
~ureaucracy safe,zuarded the rit£hts of the s~;ate. 
During the J.Iiddle A:;e s, the feudal sys tern die ta ted 
the prevailing form of economic thought. Fealty and allegiance 
~.o the lords and barons formed the basis of economic society. 
The central government vies obviously too weak to interfere 
systematically in busineso; and, because robber knights pillaged 
~nd plundered, business became an exc~edingly precarious 
ft;rcfession. 
Gradually merchant guilds were formed as a protest 
against the feudal lords. As a large portion of the burden of 
uaxati on was placed upon the guildsmen, they demanded s;jecial 
privileges not accorded to others -,;ho had no share in paying 
:nuni cipal expenses. Eventually the guilds became trade 
monopolies. 
As the towns grew in population and the guilds 
----------------· -·-------- ·--·-
=-------------------------------.u.---------------------------------------~-----------------------------------·- --------~- -·-
13A 
incre::tsed in size, the craftsmen wi tlldre~7 from the ,;wrchant 
guilds to form or~anizations restricted more or less to their 
own trades. ::~ach witl1<lra'.·:al of a craft to form its own union 
meant a y;eakening of the merchant ;;uild. Finally, the craft 
guilds doillinated everywhere, even the eoverm..tent, and each vws 
charJed with the control of its own branch of industry under 
munici11al or royal authority. 
As journeyments or as;:istant craftmen's guilds vl8re 
formed, the craft guilds entered upon a policy of exclusiveness 
which develor::;ed abuses reachin:; a cliraax at the time of the 
Reformation. Because of financial influence and deterioration 
of the craft guilds, the means of production were concentrated •-
in the hands of a few. This deprived millions of people of any 
voice or share in the rec:;ulation of goverm:.ent, trad~ and 
comrnerce. The minds of men revolted against the use of these 
trewendous :powers and they reverted to the days :preceding the 
Reformation. 
By the time of Ednard III (1326-1377) there was a 
definite reco0ni tion of classes in the cumrnuni ty. Attcrnr,ts to 
define and to regulate the laborin~ classes began at the time 
of the Black Death, (1318). King Edv~ard pasoed le3is la t ion in 
favor of the consumer. 
Gradually forei0n trade aild industry developed. Kaney 
was coming into use in the ordinary life of rural districts, 
and natural economy was being superseded by a system of cash 
bargains. 
~--------------------------------~---w.----------------------------------~ 
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The mercantile classes had been gruwing in v:realth 
and :i.epcr'tance and by the reign of "BdYmrd III, . .lad forlHed and 
incorpcrated comvanies of merchants, each of which dealt in a 
yarticular class of goods. By the rei~n of Richard II, 
(1377-1399) the English parliaments introduced legislation and 
conditio s which, eventually, as they worked out in subsequent 
centuries, fav-ored the_ grur.:th of '11:n.;lish pov1er. They really 
laid the foundations of the famous uerc~ntile ~yst~m, the poli~ 
·fw:lich ':!r:1S the cncoura;;ement of natives and discc.urageuent of 
forei:;ners,- the develupwcnt uf shi: inG and the (;rU\7th of 
lTa t i anal ileal th. 
Gradually, as 2uropcan go7c.Jrnr;lents tecame im:J}Jired by 
com,.ercial rivalry and national asrlirations, a paternalistic 
interest in business develo:,ed. r.:erchants, rewerJJ.bering 
conditions under the Feudal Systen of the Eiddle Aces were only 
too glad to take ad van ta,;e of the opJ.urtuni ties o ffe red by 
governlilental rec;ula tion. 
During the eic~hte;::nth century or 11liil'a of Enli,;htenment 1 
as it W8S called, a new conceptiLn of economic society grew: 
that of ~concmic individualisu, which soon developed into the 
doctrine of ru,;ged indi '!idualism. This :;alned its stron:;est 
focthold in En:_;land, and v1hen the colonists left for .Ar11erica, 
they did net hesitate to take this principle with them. 
Gradually, as the 1iJ~1erican r;eot;raphical frontier disappeared, 
the spirit of rug,~ed indi·ridualisu nas carried uver into the 
frontier of industl'ial enter~;rise. Ti1e pioneers of the nev1 
~~--------------------------------~---IU.-------------------------------------
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I industrial emDire Tiere reckless, aut0nomous, and self-sufficieni 
Under their "ev·ery man for himself systed', idealism and noble 
motives had nc place, and it was inevitable that there would 
be fluctuating prices, unfair wages, unreasonable hours of 
labor, unstable currencies, and cut throat competitiun. 
~~------------------------------UK-------------------------------------~ 
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Historical Background of N. R. A. 
The three najor divisions of our modern social 
structure are A~riculture, Industry and Finance. Alvays one 
,element or the other has controlled the governmental machinery 
.and the other tv1o have suffered. The tSOVorning element has 
I 
I 
!rusually been forced out of :power bec:::use it h::s become 
l 
I 
fominated by selfish, unscrupulous, and short-sitShted leaders. 
~efore industry developed, the aJricultural South dictated the 
:~aviS of the ne:. ti on. For a lonG time, the :planters and shipping 
~~nterests refused to allov1 the industrial l~orth to take part in 
lbhe formulation of governmental :~;olicies, and it was not until 
! 
i ~he Scuth came into conflict with the North over the slave 
l 
' ~~ue s t ion, that Jche Agri cul tur i st s fe 11 :from :power. 
' 
' 
Then the industrialL:;ts 1Jo..::w:~e the dictators of the 
ration's lee viS and policies, lint il a bout the year e igh teen 
t
undred and fifty, much of the 0eneral 'manufaeturint; in the 
Tnited States had been· in the household or in the shop, and it 
I 
pad been done by the labor of the far:lily or by individual 
roprietors, with apprentice assistGnts • 
. li.fter that, American ecvnomic life chan_;ed as the 
\uresent system v1as established r;i th factcry labor comrJensated 
ty wa~es and assisted by mechanical :power. The demands of the 
I 
I 
J~ivil '.':ar helped to establish the :prestige of industry and many 
1
pf the agl"iC 11 ltural states of the ~.7est, controlled by the 
i 
1
·ailroad combinations, allied ther;1selves v;ith the manufacturers I ~c==============~=========================================================4r 
----------------------------------~---------------------------------------~ 
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of the East. 
By the time of the Reconstructi0n Period (1860-1876 
the foundaticns of large scule industrialism were laid. As a 
I 
I result, gigantic cunfu~nations and m~nopolies were created. 
! These interests proceeded to exploit the natural resources of 
' 
' 
1 the country, unrestrained and unreculated, unti~ by the middle 
i of the 1880's, public opinion turned against them, because of 
:the invidious abuses which they imposed upon the people. 
President Cleveland in one of his mes.a,_;es stated 
that free comJ.etition did nut prevent rnonopolistic prices, 
itJecause such com1etition vms 11 too often stranG.Led by 
combinations quite prevalent at this time, and frequently 
'called trusts, which had for their object the regulation of 
SUJ)rly and prices of commodities nmde and sold by the members 
1 
,of the combination 11 , 
Also, President Har1ison in his first messaJe to 
ont.Sress su:::L;ested that 11 earnost at~,entiuri shou-'-d be ,;iven to 
he consideration of the auestion of 
ibhose combinatiuns of ca"J:::tal called 
how far the restraint of 
'trusts 1 is a matter of 
! 
:r.ederal jurisdiction". 
That the national c_;overnLent i"Jas ha•Jing difliculty 
n controlling trusts was obvious. Vlllen the Constitut:.on ;,;as 
i 'lri t ten, the Auori can people v1e re I)ass i ng throuiSh a sim~~'le 
! 
!agricultural era and were not faced ~ith the problems of a 
:bi_;hly industrialized natiun. Therefore the Constitution says 
Jot 11i ng of wase s, prices, 11ours of labor, a.;t>rOiJI> ti ons of 
l. G. 3 
------------------------------------------------------------
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of ca~ital, open shops, closed Ghups, trade unions, cmnpany 
unions, child labor, and conditions in mills and f~ctories. It 
is true, Con;ress was given the power to regulate co~~erce 
between the states for the purpose of controLling a great 
transportation net work; but this was because some of the state~ 
l1aving no convenient ports for foreign co:m.;,erce, ·were subject 
I 
~o taxation by their neichbors, through whose ports their 
I 
I 
tom.::1e rce vms carried on; and any state enjoying SUl:)eri or 
icondi tions to a neic:;hboring stc:,te was only too apt to take 
tdvantage of that fact. 
I 
I Under the development of "rug:_;ed individualism", 
I iilihe functiun of the r;overnrilent VIWJ to provide national~security, 
I 
I 
J;_phold lav1 and order, and Liaintain justice. That goverYllilent was 
i 
,:Jest v1hich governed least. The people had severed their 
I 
lponnection with Great Britian largely on that issue, and they 
had no desire to create a sicilarly restrictive political 
l 
authcri ty on this side of the ocean. James G. Blaine in a 
spec,ch at Portland, l.:aine, on .Auc.ust 15, 1888 corroborated this 
fact vvhen he said: "The trusts are largely private a:J.'i'airs vvith 
:;hich neither President Clevelcmd nor any pri'rate citizen has 
lthe ri;:sht to interfere". 
The opposition of the ;reaL railroad ua;nates of 
11--he day tu any interference ',-:l th their business was comparable 
I 
fo that of the trust ovmers. Charles Francis Adaum cha.racterlzec 
I 
·:·hem as private individuals, responsible to no authority and i 
I 
J ubject to no supervision, but looking solely to their own 
I 
i 
nterests. 11 Injunctions l1ad failed to check the1.1 rec(;,J . ..,h:l!.v~f'~~r·s~==1F 
1. 13. 178-9 
~~~~------------------------~-------~~--------------------------~ 
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had no terrors fer them. Secure in their power, they now 
extended their operations over land and sea; lea~ing railroads; 
buying steamboats, ferries, theatres and rollin~ mills; 
building concreted levels of road; laying dovm additional 
rails; and generally, proving themselves a power wherever 
corporations were to be influenced or legislatures were to be 
1 
bouch t 11 • 
After serving fifty-od(; years in public service, 
Senator Shelby ~. Cullom stated that the railroad officials 
"beca::1e so arro~;ant that they seei:led to asrmme that they \'l'ere 
above all law; rebating and discriminations were the rule and 
C) 
CJ 
not the exception 11 • 
en Eebrv.ary 4, 1887, the Interstate Corm:;e rce .Act was 
!pas;:ed. The act forbade pooling, rebating, ~nd discriminating 
freight char~es. It provi~ed for the open inspecticn of all 
schedules and rates, and created a corrunis uion of five members 
to receive com:plai nts fror:1 shippers and to invoke the aid of 
3 
the federal courts to prosecute offending railroad corporations. 
That the act 1:id not functicn as well as it was expected v1as 
evidenced by the repetition of its prohibitions and penalties 
in the leGislative enactnents of 1903, 1906, 1910, and 1919. 
Senator Cullom ·painted out the contumacy and venality of the 
trusts ·when he stated that, 11 the reasons why the act didn't 
function the way it should have were: first ·of all, the 
IE:xecutive did n1 t manifest any special interest in securing 
;ad0itional railroad regulation; secondly, the railroads 
1. I3. 4/91 
2. E. 6/306 
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themselves had beun very active i~ securinJ a chan~e of the 
personnel of the Committee on Interstate Cornwerc:e, :.nd men had 
been elected to tlle Senate and placed on that committee whose 
sy.mr;athies v;ere in fabor of very conservative rei;ulation, if 
1 
any regulation at all~ However, the act was of great 
importance as the first move of the ~·ederal <~overn111ent to check 
the principle of laissez-faire in business. 
In 1890 Congress passed the Shernan .Anti-Trust Act 
making illegal "every contract, combination in the form of 
1 trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trc-;de among 
2 
the several states or ·with foreign nations 11 • To enforce this 
i lavf the United States district attorneys v1ere charged v;ith the 
l 
prosecution of suspected violators. Tills act, which was much 
more comprehensive than the Interstate Comrr.erce Act, was also 
j difficult to enforce because of the ambiguity of such terms as 
:"conspiracy" and "restraint of trade 11 • The act served its 
i purpose, however, by keeping alive public interest in Lts 
~enforceJcent. Under it there were many indictLlents or bills in 
~equity against the trusts. 
The period from 1900 to 1914 marl-;:ed the opening of 
' 1 the era cf d d t· masse pro uc 1on. The number of manufacturing 
establishments grew from about 200,000 to about 2'75,000, and 
the amount of capital invested from about nine billion to over 
twenty-two billion dollars. lianufactur ing e:x:::•orts reached the 
!!billion dollar stage for the first time in 1912. This 
ijctevelopment v:as due primarily to several causes. The 
i~ ;r:o. v~rr~e !?- t o.f lll§.nufw.~ turiJ:.:l~"". =u=n=d=~~b-'=u=~·=i=n=e=· =Dp met llc·ds t\3 nc1 e...d_J; o 
B. 6/329 
B. 2/390 
' 
-.. ~~---~---------========::========~ 
20 
increase the output of rnanufactured goods. The great sup}Jly of 
accessible raw materials such as food, coal, cop~er, iron and 
petroleum helped to hasten the production of 60ods. The rapidly 
increasing population and the psychology of mass demands 
~stablished markets for these goods. The further de ve loprnent 
of universal communication and transportation facilities opened 
foreign markets for both raw materials and finished products, 
~hile the utilization of new sou~ces of power, especially 
1ydro-electric and i;asoline, expedited the entire process. 
During the Wilson administration, the Clayton Act of 
l 
1914 supplemented the Sherman law by provisions still more 
~~harp and drastic. It defined and forbade a number of acts in 
\kestraint of trade, notably })rice discriminations betv1een 
I 
I 
I ocalities, "tying ac;reer.1ents", and the formation of holding 
j~omyanies, tending to create monopolies. 
I 
I 
I · By the creation of the Federal Trade Comwission, the 
rational government took the first step in inviting big business 
~o co-operate in the task of its own purif~aation from illeGal 
practices. 
l 
I \Toodrow Wilson indicated how far we had gone to\vard the 
I b . m l1c supervision of industry when he said, "Vie are just upon 
the threshold of a ti1ne when the systematic life of this 
country will be sustained or at least supplemented at every 
fPOint by csovernmental activity. ·.7e have great tasks before us 
[and vve must enter on them as befits men charged with the 
tresronsi bili ty of shaping a nev; era". 
During the ':lorld ·:iar, the mobilization of all the 
l. B. 2/390 
2. B. 8/217 
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industrial resources of America under the dictatorial control 
of the governrr1ent did more to reconcile the American people to 
the idea of the re~ulation of private business by public 
authority, than did all the laws, orders, and prosecutions of 
the previous thirty-five years combined. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Instant Depressicn I 
The entrance of the United States into the ~orld .. , I .ar 
paved the way for the financial domination of the k1erican 
industrial macnine, and the momentum produced by that event 
continued until, when the bleak years of 1929 and 1930 arrived, 
it became obvious that the moribund structure had overworJ~ed 
itself. Even at the peak of the era of prosperity, during the 
prosperous year of 1923, approximately sixty per cent of all 
industrial enterprises v1ere not returning a profit. There was 
much unemployment, and the abuses of the competitive system 
made it difficult for a majority of business enterprises to 
return a profit. Such industries as the shoe and leather 
business, textile mnufacturing, coal mining, ship building, 
and agriculture, were definitely on the duwn grade. The 
inevitable and unprecedented marl·:et crash of 1929 v1as met by a 
stupendous effort on the part of both financial magnates and 
the Government. Banl<:e rs forr,Led pools to support the ms. rke t, 
and money lenders co-operated by reducing the rates of interest 
I on call loans. At Vh;shington, four hundred rcJlresentatives of 
American commerce, trade and industry as-sembled, at the 
suggestion of the President, for~he purpose of stabilizing 
business. This assernbly named an executive leadership of 
twenty, chosen from among them, to act as a surjreme business 
council, to stpdy conditions and to do what it could to conquer 
the most recent of A..'11erlcan panics. Durinci this em.er _;ency, the 
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proclivity of industry toward governmental interference has 
been outstanding. From a govern[j_ental point of view, it was 
literally easier to make sugc.;estions to "control" groUJ)S in 
industry, then to put a Jovernn~ental machine in place of t~1em. 
Past experiences have proved that the government could handle 
control groups, while it had had almost no experience in 
creating or,:;anisms to take over industrial functions on a large 
scale. 
However, one could have believed that the political 
government may have been subservient to the great net of 
business or economic influences which ultimately affect all of 
us, determining what we do, how we live, and whether we can 
I 
live at all. As Woodrow Vliison Daid, "our .sovernment has been 
for the past few years under the cbntrol of heads of grea~ 
allied corporations with special interests. It has not 
controlled these interests and assigned them a proper place in 
the whole system of business; it ho.1s submitted itself to their 
1 
control". 
It \Vas assumed after the crisis in 1929 that the 
cent rol groups coulrl formulate a pro cram that w auld lead us out 
of chaos, for indirectly they had been determining the lives of 
many millions of people who trusted and depended upon them. 
As the crisis grew, it became apparent th:::!t industrial 
controlled groups could not handle the situation and the only 
organization gre8t enouJh to handle it was the nation~l 
government. Financial and economic development had failed 
1. B. 8/25 
:?4 
Iunder the guidance and direction of private hands, and as an 
I 
l·emerBency measure, the Government had to take control. One 
!reason why the economic government ft-liled was that it refused 
I 
ito recognize that the World Vlar changed the y;orld it had kncvm 
Jtefore the war, that the United States had been transformed 
I from a debtor power into a creditor power. It is a common rule 
~~~f ecl,nom1cs that a debtor nation must sell more than it buys in 
1brder to IJay its debts. A creditor must buy more than he sells 
! 
I· n order to collect his debts. After the nar, business men in 
i 
!r;eneral followed the policies of a debtor nation expecting to 
I 
lrrreap the advantages of a creditor. Aided by a protective tariff 
I -
l[:they sold more than they bought, yet they expected to collect 
1 heir debts. It v;as obvious that there could not be a normal 
I 
1 djustment under prevailing conditions. 
I i Until 1929 the r:1ain cause of depressions seemed to 
I 
i'P.ave been over expansiun and reckless sueculation. The 
i 1~epress ion of 1929 had many similar causes; over development, 
over production, over speculation, over investm.ent, and over 
~xpans ion, but it is outstanding that the specula t i r.re mania of 
vhe 1929 days extended to every conceivable kind of enterprise. 
ndeed, if we study the history of American depressions and 
I 
~anics, we find that no matter ·where the trouble originated, 
~~ractically all factor's ofnational life v;ere affected seriously, 
I -
!:tnd as the individualistic system has existed, depressions came 
!:Vi th some degree of regularity. 
I 
1 In the past, we have been tau~ht that a cycle of 
!;iepres~licn would burn ~ tseJf _o1,1_t v_~! th_in a_limi._:t_ed period b~e 
I 
I 
I 
' l 
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the trouble was caused by an over production of goods, and when 
I 
the surplus was used up, a new effective derr~nd would raise 
!prices and set the wheels of industry in motion again. It 
!worked in the depressions of 1837, 1857, 1873 and 1893. 
I 
!However in 1893, t·wo-thirds of the population lived by 
!agriculture, only one-third of the population was dependent 
!upon industry and trade. Today, two-thirds of the population 
I 
!are dependent upon industry and trade; Gnly one-third is 
!actively engaged in agriculture. 
I 
I 
This depress ion, an ·aftermath of the Vlorld War, 
!forced our European customers to set up protective tariffs to 
rave their citizens from ruin. In the past, the savings of the 
ltpper and middle classes has been another source from which a 
I ew demand has often come, but here again, the destructive 
I 
j ffects of inflation and speculation during the years before 
I 
'IP-929, have weakened these classes so much, that their buying 
~~ower has been diminished to a great extent. 
Last spring, "out of perhaps thirty-five millions of 
men and women, fifteen million v1ere v:holly unemployed, and many 
I were · 
pf them in the bread lines. At least five million more, VJho 
1
·;ere working only part time, were not self-supporting. 
~~bout one- half of the industrial '::orl<:ers v1ere v1holly or 
!partially dependent on past savin~s or public relie~ 11 • 
In all, 
Banks 
lflhich 
~heir 
! 
to them •. 
had not failed, found it impossible to collec~ money,owed\ 
very structure was undermined because of the fact that 
.pers cnal savings v!Bre vti thdrawn for hoarding purposes. 
1. J.:. 8/3 
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Eunicipal and state governments were unable to borrow money or 
to provide for proper unemiJloyrnent relief. Trade and industry 
turned to the consumers for he l::p, realizing that the majority 
\of ~he :people were bankrupt or starving. The nation had 
I reached the bottom of the ~orst de::pres~ion it had ever known, 
land it was obvious that something had to be done. It was 
!because !ir. Roosevelt VIas able to convince the voters that he 
would put into effect a :programme of action corrnnensurate with 
May it be said of Franklin D. Roosevelt that he is 
He realized that the equanimity of the 
27 
I psychologically it was very desirable to restore the confidence 
of the people. It was very strunge that as a J)eople, we had 
all the requisites of prosperity, labor, plant, raw mate~ials, 
and credit enough to set them in operation if confidence could 
be restored to industry as a whole. The only way that it could 
\be done was by a united public opinion in favor of national 
laotian. Congress reacted to this demand of the people by 
giving the President broad discretionary powers. It was 
decided that during the period of emer~ency, the national 
government should control and regulate all industrial and 
agricultural activities. This did not mean that permanent 
changes in fundamentals were agreed upon, but simply that dur·ing 
the emergency the nation agreed to set 8 side some of its 
fundamental principles. It was clear that no one division of 
the social structure could exist without the prosperity of the 
other two, and the go'rernment was to mak~ sure that these 
~ivisions worked harmoniously, ~ach supporting the others; and 
~f one became weal::, the others must sacrifice somevlhat to 
restore it. In the past, we had been a nation of individuals, 
[but the point had been reached where a tremendous collective 
3ffort was necessary; and this had to take place within the 
PramevJork of an industrial and governmental organization which 
oontemplated no such pooling of will, but, nevertheless, allowed 
t when the need existed. 
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Philosophy and Provisions of N. I. R. A. 
If the :philosophy of the H.~ ... v Deal is to be understood 
porrect ly, one must trace the history of economic trends from 
~he time of the American Revolution up to the present. 
It is a known fact of history that the :parties 
trepresenting the so-called Left hcve al't·;ays advocated more 
political power for the masses. They have believed in a greater 
~conomic equality which would eventually bring about a more 
~emocratic .society. 
The Right opposes the principle of econo~ic equality, 
;pelleving that power should rest in the hands of the fe·w, the 
!select, rather than in the hands of the people. 
I I During the American Revolution, the forces of the Left 
rere in power; attempting to better the weJLfare of the poor and 
~ebtor classes. Vfl1en the Confederation failed, the Federalists, 
~elonging to the Right, es.tablished a strong central government. 
~hen follo·wed the so-called 11 R·:;volution of 1800 11 , during which 
!time Thomas .Jefferson of the Left, represented the common people 
!!After this, t_here was a gradual drift toward conservatism; the 
I 
~~leal thier classes ac.:umulated more power, and by the time John 
jR,uincy Adams was president, the government had moved far to the 
!Hight. There was a reaction to this trend and Andrew Jackson 
jWas swept into power by the forces of the Left. Gradually the 
fight carne back as the large slave-owning and property defending 
llement of the South came into power. After the Civil War, the 
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n.anufacturing element of the lTorth, representing the Right, 
~is!;laced the slave-ovming aristocrats of the 3outh. Durinc; 
this time pro:ponents of the Left, such as the Greenbackers, 
bormlists, 2nd 11 Silverites 11 , were wakin.:; deterL:ined aot.·aults 
~pon the Right. However, the Ri;ht continued in pm·;er and it 
Nas not until 1912 that the Left muve1,1ent came into power~ This 
~cquisition ofpower VJ&S possible because the Progressive 
!Republicans divided the Republican vote in the election of 1912 
~hd consequently, Wilson was elected. It was ~olioned by 
~emands for the extension of democracy, for the direct electi0n 
~f senators, for the primary system cf nominatiun, for the 
initiative and referendum and recall; for proportional 
rep1·esentatic.n and for civil service, and other reforms. 
·:rhen Vfoodrow 7/ilscn car;~e into power in 1913 as a 
representative of the Left, he secured the extension of the 
anti-trust lavis and of a lower tariff. This representation 
ended with the Var, for Harding, Coolid.:;e and Hoover were 
representatives of the Right~ They believed that if lar.je 
'usines:J organizations v;ere encourajed and helped financially by 
the goverpment, emplo~nent might be furnished to all and poverty 
night be banished. 
President Roosevelt may be considered a representativ 
~f the Left, for he believes in using the power of the 
~overnment to improve the status of the couLcn man. He believes 
n using the :.:;o·Jernment to help the poor, to reduce poverty and 
~o equalize wealth. 
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Although many commentators believed the President 
would apply his philosophy when he came into office, few 
anticipated the drastic action taken. A bill called the 
l 
!National Industrial Recovery Act was passed by both houses of 
'congress early in June and was signed by the President on 
~f the people had decreased and destructive ccmpetition had 
~risen in almost every industry. Business men had cut their 
rests of goods so they could offer 'lower prices, wages had been 
~ut and sneatshops had multiplied in many industries in which 
pen and women worked long hours for less than a living wat;e. 
Generally speaking, the new law contained the 
following provisions: a mechanism TiaG to be established whereby 
~ndustr~y, by a united action, could set up codes of fair 
~ompetition which would end the abuses in industry; the Presiden 
asswned the right to approve or reject voluntary trade codes 
reducing working hours, fixing rvac.;es, rationing production and 
r-egulating competition; the President was authorized to use a 
_icensi_;gg s.~terp fq_r on~~ea nni...ch refuaad _to 
1. G. 6 
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submit codes; the President was given the povter to set aside at 
will the Sherman and Clayton Acts to permit industrial work and 
wage codes to operate legally. 
The licensing system v1as to be used on recalcitrant 
business. By cancelling a license, the President could put a 
~hole industry out of business. 
:Ho employer could discharge an employee because he 
![belonged to a union, nor could he require his men to join a 
1 
pompany union to get a job. 
Organized Labor's objection to the company union was 
1uhat 11 the company makes the constitution, decides how the 
po~~ittee men shall be elected, creates all kinds of 
~ub-committees, provides for the meetin2;;s of these committees on 
~he premises of the company; also insists upon having equal 
!representation with employees on the election boards when 
employees' committee of a small number from both the employee 
land company shall act as a final board whose decision shall be 
inding on any matter brought before-it for action 11 • 
Because the United States market might be flooded with 
cheap goods from abroad the President was authori?.ed to embargo 
.s.ny and all imports, This provision was to protect American 
· ndustries which were compelled to increase their expenses under 
~he National Recovery Administration. 
To make new jobs, the·President was appropriated 
I~ 
p3,300,000,000 for public works. To provide money, the House 
i 
1assed a $3,459,480,90S deficiency avpropriation bill. The 
\money for the public works pro;'·ram was to be borrowed from tha 
1. lL 5 
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1Pni ted States public and put aside in a special emerbency 
bude;et. To pay the interest on these public works' borrowings 
~227,000,000 per year was to be raised in special t~~es such as 
jporporation taxes, taxes on dividends, and gasoline taxes. 
As President Roosevelt signed the bill he stated that 
~~he bill had two purposes; first, to ~et many hundreds of 
thousands of the unemployed back on the payrolls, and, secondly, 
lit.O provide for a better future by economic planning. 
By executive order, the President temporarily 
~ppointed Colonel Donald Hubbard Sav:yer, director of the 
~mployment· Stabilization Board under Hoover, as Federal 
~mergency Administrator of Public \'larks. To work with the 
lf\.dministrator, the President created a Special Board for Public 
'/orks composed of Secretaries of the Interior, 'ilar, Ac:;riculture, 
t;ornmerce and Labor, the Attorney General, an Army river and 
~arbor engineer named Colonel George R. Spald~ng, and the 
pirector of the Budget. 
Because ?resident Roosevelt had promised to put 
1 , 000, 000 met to work by autu.r.m, Colo ne 1 Sawyer was given t hi rt y 
liays to distribute $400,000,000 for hiJhway building projects 
,;hich could be started illl.t'":lediately. 
The navy was to get ~238,000,000 to build four Treaty 
cruisers, twenty destroyers, two airplane carriers, four 
subr.aarines and two ri ·1e r 6Unboa ts. Construction was to start 
as soon as the government navy yards received material. 
The Uavy was to receive also, :)9,000,000 for 290 new 
ilairplanes. 
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The States were to get ~400,000,000 for new roads. 
The Post Office and Treasury Departments were to 
receive by October l, ~loo,ood,ooo for new post offices, court 
houses, etc. 
This entire program had one objective, to put men 
back to work as quickly as possible. 
For the second staue of the program, the President 
believed that if all employers would subscribe to an industrial 
covenant, living wages and sustained employment would take the 
place of starvation wages and starvation employment. Although 
~e was relaxing the anti-trust laws, the President was against 
munopolies that would restrain trade and price-fixing, which 
would allow inordinate profits or unfairly high prices. He 
realized that if prices increased in proportion to the increase 
in wages, the whole program would be set at naught and he 
. aprlealed to mana;;ements to refrain from raising prices as long 
as possible. 
The man to supervise the formulation of these 
covenants ',vas General Hugh Sar:.uel Johnson, West Pointer, lawyer, 
originator and administrator of the ·wartime selective draft. 
He was to be assisted by the 3ecretar les of Comruerce, 
Agriculture, Labor, Attorney General, Director of the Budt;;et, 
and the Federal Trade CommiSJi.on Chairman. These assistants were 
to appoint advisory boards which would help the various 
industries to draw up codes. 
The Industrial Advisory Board appointed by Secretary 
=iRo,p~iD~_oe_c.L; Pr~ . .sLdent oUoner._9J T~otu~."' -4Jfred Pritch?rrl 
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Sloan, .Jr; Chai rrnan of Standard Cil of lTew .Jersey, ".'/alter Clark 
Teagle; President of the General Electric, Gerard Swope; 
Chairman of the Hurley l•la.chine Company of Chicago, Edv1ard Nesh 
Hurley; Vice -president of Filene.' s Department Gtore of Boston, 
Louis Kirstein; President of the Thomasville (N.C. )Chair Company, 
Austin Finch. 
This board was to serve as a link between private 
business and the officials of the recovery administration. Its 
function was to assist business men in drawinG up their codes 
and to help them interpret the various provisions. It also was 
to assist the industrialists by rendering advice and Jiving 
counsel. 
The Labor Advisory Board appointed on .Au.;ust 5, by 
Secretary Perkins included: Leo '.7olman, economist; .Joseph 
:B'ranklin, rn·esident of the International Boilerl!lalcers' Union; 
j . 
1 Sclmiederman, Secretary of the '.7onen Trades Union LeaJue; 
I 
[.roseph Dewellyn Lewis, president of the United !,:ine Ylorl~ers of 
I 
I 
I !America; .John rhilip Frey, University of Chicago lecturer; 
i 
!Edward F. J.lcGrady, American Federation of Labor's \lashini.ston 
I jlobbyist; and Sidney Hillman, president of the Ama.lJamated 
! 
!Clothing Workers. 
I On June 23, a Consumer's Advisory Board representing 
!the public was appointed, nith J.:S.ry Har:rr.iman.~ Rumsey, dau._;hter 
i 
!~of the late Railroad JCan Edward Henry Har1 i1rran, as chairman. ~ts pri~~~f~u~n~c~t~i~o~n~l~~~a~s~t~o~.p~r~o=t~e~c~t~~t~h~e~l~·n~t~e~r~e~s~t~s~~o~f~t~·l~l~e~~~~~ 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
! 
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consuming public during and after the process of code making. 
It sent representatives to all code hearings to make sure that 
no provisions harmful to consumers were included •. It watched 
prices and the quality of merchandise sold from the consumer's 
viewpoint; and if necessary, reco121~nded adjustments to the 
administrative heads of the N. R. A. 
l 
The method of procedure would be as fellows: when a 
trade group had settled its wage, price and output problems, it 
~auld apply to the Administration for a hearing. The advisory 
card would investigate to discover if the trade ~roup was 
representative of its industry. Officials would hold hearings 
for the representatives of labor in the industry and for the 
onsume rs of the industry's products. vn.1en disputes were not 
ettled by agreement between employers, laborers and consw~1ers, 
he deputy administrator would settle them by rendering a 
eclsion vThich would be subject to the approval of General·. 
ohnson and the President. The final reports would be given to 
·he Administrator who v1ould take them to the President for 
pproval. After a code was signed, it could be modified if it 
JaS unsat'isfactory, by having it ch 9 nged at another hearing, or 
' 
y having the Fresident approve of the modification. Enforceuen 
f the codes, which will be discussed below, VJas to be maintained! 
i 
\through local compliance boards v;hose chief function was to 
! ettle disputes. If the local compliance boal'd could not 
~ etCle the disa&reement, the matoer r~as to be presented to the 
hational director of compliance. 
\ 
l. G. 6 
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I The Act and Codes in Operation I 
I 
I 
~ithin one hour after the N. I~ R. A. was si~ned the 
Cotton Textile Industry submitted a code. ?ending a})proval in 
I 
jpubli c hear ins on .June 27, the code provided for the foll or1in6: 
~~ minimum \':vg e of "10 a week in oouthern mills and .;ill a week in 
\the n<rthern mills; a 44 hour week; and an aclmowled~e~:1ent of the 
!pmployee's right to collective bargaining. Collective 
i 
ipargaining means "that the organized employees of a trade or 
l·ndustry, through representatives of their own choosing, shall 
,:leal with the euployer or emr_~loyers, in the making of v1uge. scale~ 
I 1 
:~.nd working conditions". 
I The procedure followed at the public hearing should 
jreceive consideration because the hearing itself l1ad the 
l 
\!importance of being first and setting a precedent; because, it 
I 
was also the simplest in outline; and because, i.n all 
lbrobability, the other industries W<.,Uld be guided by it. 
i 
I The hearing ~as held in the auditorium of the 
! 
1
oepartment of Cor;].rnerce J3uildin,:;, with General .Johnson presiding, 
!~i tting at a long table on a raised :platfcrm. Donald Richberg, 
I 
1is legal advise~ sat at his right and Alexander Sachs, the 
~~;a::: t ~ :~n t :::e •:a: 1 :!1:8 ::: n: s :i :::: r ~e ::: :~ ::m:he A: t :::, e:: t eputy Administrator Allen. Behind the long table were the three I I lct vi sory Boards, and in fr0nt c· f it wu.s a long press table. ~~resident Gecr,;e A. Gloan of the Cotton Textile Institute was 
l. B. ?/210 
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the general spokesman for Industry. Leo \.olruan and American 
Federation of Labor's President Green were the representatives 
for Labor, while the new colnJ,littee headed by :cary Harriiv.an 
Rumsey represented the Consumer. 
After the int reductions and usual fori1la lit i es, Donald 
Richberg outlined the procedure to be folloTied, stating that 
Industry would be the first to be heard, then Labor and finally 
the Consumers. 
After listening to the speakers for Industry, several 
general conclusions were obvious: first, it was a~parent that, 
because of the intricacy of our industrial machinery, the 
treating of a given industry as if it Vl'_:re a unit separable 
from the rest, was eoing to present r:1any complications; 
secondly, it also becar:J.e evident that no man, however liberal 
his general point of view, \7anted to have his business penalized 
by a code; in the third place, it v1as obvious that these 
industrialists had failed to grasp the· fundamental 1mrpose of 
the National Recovery Act, i.e., to transfer laborers and 
worl<:ers into consumers of manufacturers' goods. 
The Labor representatives welcomed the opportunity to 
present their ar~~uments, for Lo.bor neither signed nor had a 
direct part in makin_; or submitting codes. They pointed out 
that, if pennitted· to do so, the em1)loyers ·would lovl8r the pay 
of men earning high v;ages, in order to offset the anticipated 
raises of those working for a minimum wage. They also urged 
that a "real minimum" be es t1::1 bl i shed be cause the e::cept ion to 
the mintml.liD rate in the ·oroposc~d code afforded an opportunity 
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I 
I 
1 for a wide classification of workers into the below minir.1.um 
I 
1 claso. For example, an emrloyer could call an employee an 
apprentice and could pay him any waJe he saw fit. 
When the code provisicn of a minimum pay of :i~ll a week 
in the North, and $10 a week in the South was presented, 
President Green pointed out that the average of 011.40 was lower 
than that of any other of the one hundrGd and fuur industries 
reported by the Labor Department for lby, 1931, save only one, 
the shirt and col1ar industry. It aloo was known by thorn prese 
t the heclring that the average wage paid in all manufacturing 
industries in J,1a_y, 1933 vms ;.)17. 40. 
Finally the industrial representatives made a 
concession by agreeing not to employ children under sixteen in 
he cot ton r;li lls during the err:ergenc y period. 
By the stroke of a pen and by an indirect process, an 
1 
vil ·which vurious reform or;;anizations had fousht for years, 
l.,ns abolished. That there v;as a need for reform legislation of 
I his type, was unquestionable. :For exal;.ple, one writer has 
l 
: ointed out that fifty children a week in Gaston County, North 
!Carolina had applied for v1orking permits because they had 
I 
/reached the age of ty;elve years. l.lill owners had allowed 
!ignorant parents to bring their children into the mills to work 
jfree, as helpers, for father and mother. They had allowed the 
I 
I arents to ·Jontinue this practice until, under a workman's 
lcomnensation law, the children were considered v1orkers v:ho could I ~ id•:•, compensation. 
, ... =,, .. ,~c.-:co·~=-===-=-=-=---==============91= 
From that time on the en11)loyers had simply 
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refused to admit these children into the rnills. 
It was estimated that at one time there were 5, 000 
working permits in effect at one time in Gaston County, simply 
bec:-:use i,;norant parents put their children into the r:1iL.s as 
soon as a permit could be obtained, in order to increase the 
family income. 
Of course the employees v1ere not entirely to blame, 
for certain employers v1ho had purchased mills at low prices 
during the depression, and were intent on making profits and 
nothin3 else, vwre very vlilling to work their employees and 
machinery to the limit at fearfully lov1 runni n;,; costs and wa.;es. 
The concession agreement on the part of the employees 
y:as considered a Siaart gesture for it deluGed the employers 
with public ap1)roval and gave them a better or)portuni ty to 
oprJose Labor's extreme demands. It was also thought that the 
emrl o ye rs, generally, would not lose out financially; for, of 
the 600,000 United Stutes textile uorkers, only abcut 15,000 
were children working mostly in the southern mills. 
The sr)ealcers for Consumers, in :;eneral, ur(.;ed a hic;her 
minimum wage in order that Labor would have more than a 
subsistence wa10e and could become a Consumer. 
After four days of discussion, the hearing concluded 
with the presentation of the Industry's revised Code, with 
several amendn~ents as to the functioning of its machinery, and 
.. ·~ ,. .. 
y:i th the r:li nimum vrage lifted frc.,m .)10 and ~;11 to ~~12 and : ... :13. 
It also provided for a fifty-hour week, and granted the workers 
l. T.:. 3/7 
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the right to collective bargaining. 
Nine days later, on July 9, the l'resident aj)proved 
the Cotton Textile Code subject to certain specified conditions, 
the most important uf ·which provided that no waGes in the 
higher brackets should be lowered by the proviuicns of the 
code. The code was not to go into effect until July 17, the 
second l:onday after the President's approval. The interval -vvas 
given to allow the tr1enty-three per cent of the industry, which 
1did not stibscribe to the code, time to aJree to its provisions 
I 
or be forced in by the Gcvernment 's licensing power. 
The final steps were taken on Au;~ust 1, 1933 \ihen the 
aduinistration's three members-without vote-were apointed to 
the Cotton Textile Industry and Supervisory Con~~ttee. The 
non-voting n:embers ·were General .Johnson, Deputy Administrator 
Slater and Dr. Leo Vlolman, Chairman of the Labor Advisory 
Board. 
Although the Textile Code was a model code, it uas by 
no means .perfect. However the }resident was anxious to have it 
go into operation, for cotton mills Tiere working overtime 
tryinc to accumulate a surplus before costs increased. Big 
industries were reacting too slowly in formulating codes and a 
r:;onth had passed since the :H. R. A. began to function. 
Only one 6ode had been approved. None of the big 
industries, ·coal, steel, lumter, clothing, oil, etc., had 
presented codes; and allowing time for hearinGS, compromises, 
and Presidential approval, the possibility of having them put 
i_r~t:...0 O_JlA"I"Atinn 'crithin a :nerjnr] nf' ~ TA''j mont_h.§ :;me "'lic·,ht: Tt. 
41 
was intimated that industries were IT~king a profit because of 
the anticipated codes and were in no hurry to raise their own 
labor costs by forming or adopting codes. The Attorney General 
did not hesitate to point out that the anti-trust laYJS were not 
suspended except for industries v1hich had adopted trade codes 
a:oproved by the President. 
To expedite conditions, General Johnson engaged 
Charles F. Horne;r Df Kansas Ci t;y as publicity r.1anacer, to 
select a Recovery Act symbol for display in store windows, in 
1 
the homes, and to make propa,:;anda for public SUl)port. This 
procedure was necessary, for Department uf' Labor and Federal 
Eeserve Board charts indica ted that industrial production was 
increasing much faster than payrolls, just as it did in 1928 
and 1929. Industries uere stocking up with comLoditics before 
prices increased, which indicated that when prices did go up, 
buying would stop. During the v1eek of July 10, the Arr:erican 
Federation of Labor estimated that fror:l J.J:arch to I[ay, Industry 
had boosted production 35.6;0 v;hile v.;orkers' incc·raes had 
increased only '1%. 
In the meantine, the rublic Works proJram under 
Public Works A.dministrator Secretary Ickes had been launched. 
It had beGn decided that eighty cents out of every Federal 
dollar spentwere to go for waJes and every dollar was to count 
in reducing breadlines and takinES families off public cha.rl ty. 
The first group of projects a}!prvved, prL vided fer an 
outlay of $115,~il3,610, of v;llich ~~64,561,5,12 v;as for Federal 
1. r. 6/11 
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purposes, 038,000,000 was to be spent on the Boulder Dam 
project. The balance was to be used for renovation and repairs 
on Government plants. Another ~;5o, 000,000 vmnt for· roads in 
national parks and forests and on Indian reservations. 
Twenty-five wunicipalities received .~952,068 for waterworks and 
ser;er systems. Of this sun~, 30% \7as an out and out gift to 
each town, the remainder of which vms to be repaid to the 
Government at a future date. It ·was estimated that the total 
outlay ·would supply 21,517 men with vwrk for one year. 
In order to have a project accepted, it had to 
benefit a corrll:' .. uni ty :permanently and socially; it had to be ready 
to start immediately and be finished 17ithin a year; and it had 
to be self supporting. 
During the interim, the industrial program had been 
progressing slowly. Durmg the v1eek of .July 17-24, General 
Tolms on was swamped vvi th codes, none of v1hi ch met with his 
~pproval. I;:8.jor codes filed were these of Steel, Soft Coal, 
il-'Umber, Wool Textiles, Oil, Cloak and Suit, !Len's Clothes, 
~lectric Goods and Contracting. nevertheless, General Johnson 
! 
I 
j(elt that some step was necessary which would hasten the 
~c•.::eptance of codes in order that purchasing pov1er and 
~~onsumption could 6atch up with production, und. prevent a fresh 
I 
1pollapse. Cn July 17, he suggested that a ter; .. porary c.:;eneral 
I 
pede be put intc operation unt1l .January l, 1934. He intimated 
rha t a ·wartime publicity campai;;n to induce 
subscribe voluntarily was necessary, for no 
all employers to 
law existed to force 
It upon industry and business. He <'llso sug.;ested that arproval 
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i !of regular trade codes befvre that date, would release all 
i j"partners 11 in the subscribing industry. ~hth the excerJtion of 
I ousehold servants and farm hunds, all eii!ployees were to be 
~~ivided into two groups; tho~e who wurked in factories and shvp~ 
jland those ·who VJorked in offices and stores. Although no employe 
\tvrould be guaranteed a full ;;;eek's work, employers of the first 
~~roup vvere to be asked not to work their help m,;re than eight 
I 
!1ours a day or thirty-five hours a week, and not to pay less 
i 
~t~han forty cents an hour. Employers of the second ~;roup were to 
I e as}ced not to worlc their help more tl1an forty hours a week, or 
I o ~lay them less than ~)15 to ::a2 a week, depending U}!On the size I 
:P f the locality. Em11loyers hiring those under gron.p two v1e re to 
I 
1
pe asked to run their offices and stores fifty-two hours a week 
n order that additional workers would be hired. They were to 
\agree that there would be no child labor, no wage cuts to the 
!Proposed minimum, no profiteerint;; and they v1ere to agree that 
tprice increases.would go up as slowly as possible • .ProfessionaJ1: 
and "executive"employees earning more than $35 a \Yeek were to be 
\;;xempt frcm this aJreement. 
I No sooner had the President accepted this plan on 
truly 20, than the Government Printing Office stclrted to turn out 
i 
li 11 ions of the ''partnership agreements 11 • :Be;; inning July 27, 
Jostoen started to deliver a copy to every employer hiring three 
IJr more persons. The employer ·,·:as to si~~n the covenant·,stating 
·hat he would abide by the agreer:ent, and then he was to mail it 
I 
pack to the Government. In return he was to receive sit:;ns and 
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placards(:Blue Eagles) with which he mic;ht advertise his 
l 
compliance with the President's program. I . 
In case patriotism did not work, employers were to be 
"induced" into signing, by a form of boycott. Consm;lers, 
particularly women, were asked to sign a pled~e statin~ that 
they would patronize and sur,port only those employers and 
workers who were members of the K. R. A, 
Francis Horner conducted the publicity drive, having 
·full page advertising spreads in newsr.apers and macazines, 
speeches and sermons from the pulpit, messases from sit;;nboards, 
radio talks, "canned speeches 11 , and hi;:;h y;ressure exhortations 
I on the cinema screens. The President inaugurated the }Jrogram.. ____ _ /
lin a nation wide broadcast on Monday, .July 14, askinG all those 
who were willing to sign the agreement to communicate the fact 
to him at the ','/hite House. 7/ithin four days 20,000 reto 1 onses 
!had been turned in, an indication that the public was willing to 
I 
respond to the appeal. 
An Aucust l, the lT. R. A. drive officia:;.ly opened, and 
in order to gain free and good publicity, many of the bi,; 
!companies hastened to assure the President of their co-operation; 
but, many employers, after signing the 11 partnership'1 code, 
. . 
!wondered how they could fulfill the agre0t1ent und stil.L stay in 
business. 
In the meantime, Gene rs:l Johns on continued his at ter:1pts 
~o codify the big industries. He indicated that he could ~et 
!the kind of a code he \'•anted, when he convinced the United 
i 
lt:lt.~tP.!'-1 Rhinhnilrlers 8t their 1oead,J;;),gJ3 tlJa~ he l70!(Ig _reco~d 
1. 1.r. 7/13 
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i.hat the entire Havy program be executed in the Government yard 
f they failed to accept what he considered a fair deal fer the I . 
1 ~hi -pbuiiders and the laborers. Another example Ylas the Oil Code i . 
I 
1
n1en the oil operators and workers failed to a~ree upon an oil 
I ~ode, after weeks of discusr:'ion, General Johnson imposed a code 
i 
~pf his own. It was I)lain to be seen that industry v1as out to 
I 
: ake advantage of every opportunity, to mal{e personal gains in 
I 
I 
; he fonnulation of the codes. After going into the mills and 
I 
' 
Dlast furnaces at I'i ttsburg to talk to employers on work and 
rwages, Secretary of Labor Perkins had objected to t .. 1e Steel 
Industry's limited concessions to Labor. As an example she 
!Pointed out that the proposed forty hour week would not help to 
~e-employ 150,000 jobless steel workers, nor would the proposed 
tninimum wage (25,!t to 40¢ an hour) help to restore the 1926 
I 
I 
'pure he; o i ng power. 
By Au.;ust 24, the If. R. A. figured that it had 
,)laced about nine million workers under work and wage codes, 
I 
,igned by one million employers. In spite of this, re-enq:loymeni 
1
·igures were not :lreeping~ace Yiith the numbers of uBlue Eagles 11 
i 
;iven out. There were also a numLer of 11 chiselers 11 vvho had not 
1igned the re-employment agreement. To combat this problem, 
~resident Roosevelt on Au_.;ust 8, had issued an executive order 
~1hic~ permitted cancellations of all ciOVernmental contracts with 
·pon-lo~. R. A. manufacturers. 
The campaign was bet.;inning to progress on a · 
, onscription basis rather than a voluntary one and com}Jlaints 
I ;ere ber:;inninrt to come i:o_to the_Administxntio~t, b~~~ ...o...:L_ti1a. 
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effects of mass emotion stirred up by n. R. A. crusaders. 
Definite results were being produced. Durin.:; the 
·.reek of August 21, Gee:. etary of Labor Perkins announced thS. t 
1,100, 000 indus trial v.ro rke rs had been re-employed since J.furch 4; 
I 
:eekly payrolls had risen by :;~29, 000,000; 400,000 men got new 
"actory jcbs in the month of ,~uly. Employment was at the 
lpctober 1931 level, payrolls as of Earch 1932. On AUgust 19, 
;~eneral Johnson reported that he had succeeded in wrangling codef 
out of the lumber, stel~l, and oil industries, the first 
I 
najor industries(aside from textiles) to be broutjht under the 
:~upervision of the Recovery Act. Estimated jobs created were as 
I 
~allows: lumbe~ 15,000 men; steel, 50,000 men; oil, 240,800 men. 
On Aueust 27, the Automobile Code was signed. An 
ntercsting provision had been inserted in this agreement which 
I ffected directly the rest of the later codes. To comply with 
i he collective barcaining requirement of the law, and to keep 
heir plants non-union, the following prevision was presented: 
!Employers in the industry may exercise their ri,;h~ to select, 
etain, or advance em·oloyees on the basis of individual merit, 
I -
I 
'·i thou t reG;ard to their membershir; or non-:membership in any 
1 
r;;-ani za t ion 11 • As a word of explanation, the "non-union nhq1 is ~~ 0 Shop in which union men are not employed, in ·.lhich there is 
~o organization of the workers, and in ·which the workers, as a 
~~onsequence, have no voice in the determination of questions 
iihich affect them. In such shLps, the dictum of the emplo~er 
's final as to all thin~s, and his right of discrimination or 
1. G. 2/Vll 5 
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discharge for any reason or for no reason is absolute. " 
Organized labor pointed out that 11merit 11 would be 
interpreted so that manufacturers could discharge union workers. 
N. R. A's Labor Advisory Board accepted the stipulation but 
stated that it had no precedent. The immediate effect ·,·fas 
that other non-union code 1J1.akers in Washington began to write 
2. 
fulsome "merit systems" into their labor agreements until 
General J"olmson stated th~1t there would be no more codes \'tith 
3 
such clauses in them. 
Although the Automobile C·ode was ac cepted one 
prominent concern was not included. I am referring to the 
Ford Plant. Although Mr. Ford paid better v:ages than his 
competitors under the code, he had an antipathy to its collectiv 
bargaining clause which might unionize his factories, and to 
the clause which permitted the :National Automobile Chamber of 
Comn:erce to pry into his books and unearth his trade secrets. 
J'Er. Ford was subject to the Code's provisions, whether he 
signed it or not, and could be fined $500 a day for its 
violation. If the President so desired, he could license him 
out of business. However, the issue involved more than the 
!Automobile Code. It was the first encounter between the new 
"robust collectivism11 and an exponent of the theory of 11 rugged 
individualism". General Johns0n could not appeal for a boycott 
because r.:r. Ford raid a higher \7age scale than that provided 
in the code, and he did not desire to have a court fight at this 
crucial point in the program. For example, Labor Day had 
1. B. 7/235 
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arrived and only two million were re-employed compared with the 
stated objective of six million. The .American Federation of 
Labor announced that 11, 500,000 were stil~wi thout ·work. The 
' 
temporary re-employment agreements would automatically lapse 
December 31, then the N. R. A. emphasis would be on the 
permanent codes lim.i ted to a few major industries. N. R. A. 
still lacked effective machinery to cope with the price rises 
it was stimulating. Retail prices had gone up 8% during 
August, io% since J!ay, Private capital was still afraid to 
help finance the New Deal. 
The recovery organization itself had its first 
serious breech. Dudley Cates, former Vice-president of J\larsh 
and !CcLennan, large insurance firm in Chicago, serving wi thou.t 
pay under General ·.rohnson, resigned on August 31, as Deputy 
Administrator for Industry, because of his opinion in 
interpreting the law's collective bargaining provision. The 
resignation of Cates was regarded as a definite trend toward 
the complete unionization of industry. 
I 
1 General Johnson believed that the N. R. A. should 
I 
J,allow VJorkers to choose their own methods of collective 
I 
jbargaining. The American Federation of Labor representatives 
lin the N. R. A. headquarters had worked incessantly, trying 
.I 
Ito induce Labor to choose its existing unions organized 
!horizontally throughout industry on the basis of crafts. I . . 
1 Deputy Administrator Cates believed that workers 
I 
!should scrap the old craft unions, and should organize 
I 
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vertically on the basis of industries, such as the building 
industry, and the printing industry. For example, plumbers, 
bricklayers, electricians, carpenters and ste .1 constructors, 
instead of belonging to separate trade organizations, should 
4=-orm one compact building union for that industry. Each 
ndustrial union then could pick its own leaders from among its 
! 
'pvrn shop workers. The American Federation of Labor saw that if 
:his proposal was accepted, its power was at an end, that its 
I 
porizontal unionization would be abclished. Although General 
rohnson agreed in theory with his deputy, he decided that the 
I 
1orkers must do their own union choosing; therefore Deputy Cates 
i 
I • d 
·es1gne • 
One bright light in the gloomy picture was the fact 
uba t a Coal Code, after nearly tv10 months of arguments, st rilces, 
· nteipretations of collective bargaining,vas signed, not 
I 
. p.owever ~ without, the personal influence of the President of the 
Vnited States. The agreement unionized 95% of the soft coal 
lndustry and gave the Administration its first detailed wage 
\agreement based on a code. 
I The strike problem was ~nether dilemma with which 
\~he N. R. A. was confronted. The strikes were undertaken or 
I 
~~hreatened to force better codes, to gain union recognition, 
3.nd to revenge 1~. R. A. violations. The im;~;ediate result was 
~hat re-employment gains were being heavily offset by men 
·~alled from their regular jobs. Both the Ford and the Coal 
~ontroversies indicated the 'impotence of the Il. R. A· to put 
I 
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I down labor controversies created by the 11. l • .R.: A. .it VJas 
I 
I accepted that the N. R. A. could use force on employers who 
I 
jviolated codes, but it vms powerless to deal with employees 
!who did so. The National Labor Board was impotent, for it was 
I 
ian extra-legal body, nowhere in the law, but bQcked only by the 
I 
!President's prestige. I . ln only one code had Labor surrendered 
I its right to strike, and that hadbeen a conciliatory measure in 
!the Coal Code. 
I 
i Because of these strikes, regional labor boards were 
!established in each of the twelveFederal Heserve districts of 
I 
! the nation. Employers, representatives of the government, and 
frepresentatives of labor were chosen for the~e boards. The 
!number of members varied according to the distric~ but each 
1group was equally represented. 
I The increasing number of strikes was a source of 
IFrave concern to N. R. A. officials and every influence was used 
lbpon laborers to submit their troubles to the ~ational Labor 
I 
~Board before they resorted to strikes. 
I 
General Johnson made two important announcements in 
1 
rne of his addresses. The first was that in his estimation, all 
·~orkers should join labor unions, and the second, that the 
!government would oppose strikes as a means by which workars 
!should 0ain what they desired. 
There was no question that these strikes stood in the 
';;ay of business recovery. They interfered with the resumption 
lor production and helped to eliminate profits in business. They 
I 
1. G. ?(h) 
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also cut down purchasing power because they diminished the 
incomes of ·workers. In spite of these abuses, the strikes may 
have indicated that production was increasing and that prices 
were higher. If there was an increase in business, employers 
would be inclined to enlarge profits for themselves rather 
than pay higher wages to the men. There fore worl~ers would 
undertake to improve their lot by forcing employers to grant 
their demands by resorting to the strike. 
In the neantime, Industry was to govern itself as much 
as possible through trade associations, a form of economic 
110 ve rnment which would make its own rule's of fair trade 
practices, of fair wages, and fair working hcurs.· Kachinery 
was to be set up in each industry in order to provide for 
adequate enforcement of rules·. The trade association was to 
investi3ate reported violations of code ~revisions, such as 
wages, hours of work, and unfair practices; and would check 
recalcitrant members of the industry; otherwise the entire 
industry would suffer. 
If the trade association failed to correct violations, 
the rna tter might be referred to the local compliance boards 
which were set up in September to act in cases of reported 
violations of the President's blanlcet code. These committees, 
composed of six members, had been created in all parts of the 
country. The members had been selected by a committee composed 
of members of various local organizations including the Chamber 
of Coerrnerce, Retail Merchants Association, J~nufacturers 
~-~-~---o~ .. -~~~-------------------------
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Association, Labor Organizations, Federation of Women's Clubs, 
and the Bar Association. The six members of each committee 
represented the employers, the consumers, labor, and the law. 
Although most of the employers \'lho signed the N. R. A. 
had attempted to live ur~ to it, there were caGes where 
recalcitrant employers attempted to evade the provisions of 
their individual codes. For instance, owners of a cot~on texti~ 
mill in Georgia signed the Cotton Textile Code and·then 
attempted to evade the specific stipulations of that document. 
Instead of raising the ·wages of its women workers from seven 
dollars a weel<: to .thirteen, as the code required, they fired 
them all and rehired them the next morning as apprentices at 
four dollars a week. 
Another "chiseler" was a restaurant chain which paid 
vvaitresses seven dollars a ·week plus their meals which averaged 
about fifteen cents a day. After signing the Restaurateur's 
Code, they raised the waitresses pay to thirteen dollars as 
agreed, but they immediately deducted a dollar a day for 
waitresces' meals which brought the girld salaries back to seven 
dollars a week. 
On October 10, General Johnson had ordered a Gary, 
Indiana r6adhcuse proprietor, a market owner, and beautician of 
New Rochelle, lTew York, a Lm7ell Massachusetts' restaurateur, 
and a Chelsea, !liasoaclmsetts 1 dry cleaner to surrender their 
!u. R. A. insit;nia to their local rjQstmasters because they had 
I 
!violated their wage and working time agreements. 
I 
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During the week of October 23, President Roosevelt 
issued an executive order providing a penalty of $500 fine or 
six months imprisonment or both for anyone 11 falsely rerJresenting 
himself to be discharging the obligations or complying uith the 
President's Re-employment AGreement or of any code of fair 
competi tion 11 • 
Under the new executive order, General Johnson, was now 
empo·wered to jail and fine such offender:.>. He made it very 
explicit that small merchants and other employers operating 
under blanket,. temporary codes were just as liable to 
prosecution as those who had signed permanent codes. 
On October 25, General Johnson announced that protean 
H. R. A. was to paGs through a stage of reorganization. '1'he 
!Administration was divided into five permanent branches: 
~.'tirr'xtract l ve Industries (including motors and shipping); 
!construction and JZachinery{includin(; lumber and me.tal products); 
I 
~.[Chemicals, Leather and 0ther ili,qnufactures; Trades, Services, 
!Textiles and Clothing. Each branch had its own admlnistrator 
i 
ivho acted as a deputy to General Johnson. Johnson personally 
I 
i itook char.ge of the fifth department: Compliance. 
I 
j The structure of the Compliance Board was based on 
i 
ltwen ty-six district officers of the Department of Commerce, 
I 
,:rhose individuals desiring to make a complaint against a code 
I 
I 
riolator were to go to the local post office, fill in a blank, 
land file the charse with the district compliance officer. lf 
the district compliance officer could not set.tle the case, it 
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was to be turned over to a Divisional Administrator. lf he 
could not settle the case, it was to be given to the National 
Comrlliance Board. If that body was unable to cope with the 
situation, the case was to go to General Johnson who could turn 
it over for prosecution to the Attorney General or the Federal 
Trade Commission. It was aade clear that the district 
1 compliar.ce director was not an enforcement officer in any sense 
of the word. His function was to attain compliance by education 
explanation, and adjustment. 
By the first of november, open critic isms of the 
N. R. A. were beginnin~ to appear. The November issue of the 
Federal :Board Bulletin issued a stateaent that there vms a 
decline in industrial activity in those industries in which 
lproeessing taxes or codes lnd become e ffe cti ve recently. 
General Johnson immediately denied the statement, 
stating that practically every major industry was operating 
).mder a code since last August, and with the exception of the 
steel, every report received from these industries indicated a 
definite upward trend. 
William Randolph Hearst· published an open letter to 
'President Howard Davis of the Amer lean Newspaper :Publishers 
~ssociation in which he described the N. R. A. as "a handicap r· 
[
nd not a help to recovery, that, as a matter of fact, it was 
1niversally impracticable, and if persisted in will become 
l 
niversally detrimental". 
I The Chicago l'ri bune and the Hearst papers be 1~an an 
1~Jii t QL:la...l_at tack upon the lJ. R. A. The T,ri bqne bel i eved _thn t 
1 _ . .I. b/1o 
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the federal control of industry by codes enforced by Federal 
authority failed to meet the expectations of the administrator~ 
failed to satisfy the economic requirements of the country, and 
1 
failed to remedy the ills for which they were used as a cure. 
Mark Sullivan, touring the 111idwest, was of the 
opinion that the people v;ere willing to accept the U. R. A. as 
\ a ·preventive,, but had no
2 
idea of letting it become a 
permanent police department. 
Walter Lippmann believed that Con:.;ress meant that 
codes should, under certain conditions, be permitted and not 
universally imposed, that the dicta to rial spirit of the 
H. R. A. was producing a revulsion of feelinG against 
bureaucratic control of American economic life, and that the 
trouble was not in the act itself but in the misconception of 
''Nhat could and ou:;,;ht to be attempted under the act. Even 
\Stanley Baldwin made a speech in
3
England comparing I)resident 
Roosevelt to Hitler as a dictator. 
1. G. 8/10 
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Friction Between lif. R. A. and Industry 
Polite friction was developing between the N. R. A. 
I
I and the De:partmen t of Commerce. The thirteen man H. R. A. 
Industrial Recovery Board on Tihich sat General Electric's Gerard 
lswope, Standard Oil's Vfal te r C. Teagle, and General 1Jo tor's 
I 
~Alfred P. Sloan had been drawn from the Department of Commerce's 
!Business Advisory and Planning Council, a body of sixty public 
I 
I 
These gentlemen, becoming impatient with ltspirited tycoons. 
jiN• R. A. labor policies, had threatened to resign. During the 
jtweek of November 7, Secretary of Commerce Roper gracefully 
!~voided an awkward situationwhen he announced that, in ~~ccordance with a rotation system, a new board, on which Pierre 
Samuel duPont, United States Steers Myron C. Tnylor, Reynold's 
D:'obacco's Clay VlillLams, and Sears, Robuck's .Hobert E. Vfood were 
~he big names ·,7hich YJould replace the Swope Board. Before 
~etiring, General Electric's Swope laid before the .Advisory 
I 
~nd Planning Council a plan to take the N. H. A. out of 
'~overnmental hands and make it self-governing. The plan was 
I 
!~ssentially the national ca.rtel system which he had I)roposed in 
~931. Its principal features were: 
1. Each trade association under a code would elect 
ex~cutives to supervise its affairs with the 
assistance of a minority of one or more N. R. A. aGents 
or agents of the JOVernment departra.ent taking over this 
work permanently. 
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2. If the governing board of the codified trade association 
Y:as unable to e:·.act compliance with the code by any 
member, the board would lay its complaint before the 
Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice. 
3. Supervising all trade associations would be a national 
chamber of commerce and industry, located in Washington. 
This chamber would be composed of delegates from trade 
associations, from ·which would be chosen a board of 
governors. This board would elect an executive 
committee, on which the Secretary and Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce would also serve. At the top of 
the pyramid would be a board of appeals, including 
r~presentatives of the President sitting in with 
industrialists, serving four month shifts in Vlashin;;ton. 
Of course, Labor was not repre3ented in the controlling 
hierarchy, and irrunediately stated that the people of the 
United States could not delegate such broad powers to 
the same management which failed to relieve urnemplo ymen t 
and restore purchasing power, under the Old Deal. 
JJ:rs. M. H. Rumsey's lT. R. A. Consumer's Advisory 
~oard also stated that the consumer shoul:i be recognized, that 
~ne of the three divisions of the social order would suffer at 
~he expense of the other two. 
I 
l 
In order to "pigeon-hole" the trend exemplified by the 
3wope Plan, President Roose vc 1 t immediately :iathe red de partmenta 
reports to sho·w that two million people had been re-employed 
Jince "-..,'h._ e 1r R ell '. • 
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overproduced in anticipation of rising prices, real outlets 
for the same industrial :products were greater at th1s time then 
they were in the summer boom; that hourly wages had increc::sed 
20% w:1i le the ave ra3e hours of work per wer:Jk decreased from 
42.3 to 31.8; that the present time vras not considered to be a 
propitiqus time for a chan3e in program. 
This precarious situation passed in a few weeks when 
the ninety-day trial period stipulated by SteersN. H. A. code 
came to an end. Had they wished, steelmasters could have asked 
for a re-hearing on their code and could have tried to get the 
Government to alter their wage, hours, and marketing agreements. 
Instead, the American Iron and Steel Institute asked 
Administrator .Johnson to continue its code unti 1 !>lay 31, 1934 
and expressed its satisfaction with the operations of the code 
in its effects on the industry. Reporting to the N. R. A. on 
:November 17, the Iron and Steel Institute stated that 213 of 
the 237 companies in the industry had betwec;n .June 17 and 
October 14, increased their waGes 32.1%, their payrolls 28.3;<;. 
When .Johns on forwarded this re1lort to the President, 
he included soi!le n. R. A. statistics gathered from 208 companies 
These indica ted that between June and Septer!lber the i nr1ustry 
had raisec1 its average wages per hour 19.9%(frcm 52.8 cents to 
63.6 cents), had decreased t 11e avtJraGe worl<: week 16. 8%. However 
the report showed that from .June 17, the industries operating 
schedules had declined from 4?% of capacity to 4t1~~. But, 
claimed General .Johnson, since Auc:;ust 15, finished steel prices 
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i!J.ad increased from 1.979 cents per pound to 2.015 cents •. Pig 
~ron had risen from $15.94 per gross ton to $16.61. 
A controversy had arisen because of the fact that 
~~enry Ford had not signed the re-employment agreement. 'l'he 
~Pi vi lian Conserv:-1 t ion Corps was JOing to buy 1, 500 light trucks. 
1;;. Ylashington Ford Dealer, under the code agreement, had put in a 
\bid for $169,000 under his nearest competitor. 
General Johnson had made the decision that Ford cars 
~.-;ere not eligible for governmental contracts, and as soon as he 
could find ~ definite violation of the code on Ford's part, he 
1Nould turn the case over to the Attorney General. Nevertheless, 
obser1rers anticipated a collision between Comptroller General 
John Raymond l1icCarl, tsar of the United States Treasury 
~xpendi tures since 1921, and General .Johnson. l'.:cCarl is 
n--esponsible to Congrer3s alone, by law, holds office fifteen 
[years, can be removed only by joint reuolution of Congress or 
I mpeachrnent, is ineliGible for reappointment. He has more power 
over Treasury ex:r!endi tures than the President, and must sec ever~ 
theck that is written from one cent to one billion, Although he 
I / 
j nterprets Congressional la''' r;ith literal exactness, he can be 
< verridden by no Govern;::1ent official, not even by General 
I 
luo:ms on. 
During the ·~'leek of lrovo _ber 6, H. P. Sr1bine, the Ford 
·Dealer in :Bethesda, Maryland, sent a letter to Com:rtroller 
·icCGrl complaininJ that Jeneral Johnson had declared his low bid 
I 
n the 1,500 trucks which the Civilian Conservation Corps 
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proposed to buy, as ineligible because of ~r. Fords failure to 
sign the Automobile Code, and had stated,that, under the 
Presidential rulinG, only Blue Eagle firms could receive 
Governmental contracts. D"'aler Sabine protested that his firm 
was under the Blue Ea@e; that he had submitted the bids as a 
private dealer, not as a representative of the Ford Motor 
Conrr:•any;. that he did not feel that he should be penalized 
because of any disa;;reement between llr. Ford and the Hecovery 
!Administration. 
It was the General opinion that Comptroller l.lcCarl 
I 
1;vould uphold the letter of the law, and v1ould a\'Jard Dealer 
Salline his contract, regardless of the n. R. A. 
Vlhile J.ilr. J.r:cCarl was cogitating, Henry J:ford, hac1 a 
c11ange of attitude. He had been quiet up to this point, but now 
te ismied an OPProbious public statement to the effect that 
!Johnson was attempting a grave injustice upon his law abiding 
I I erican industry, that he was talking like a dictator and the 
1
f3upreme. Court combined. 
I Tv10 weeks later, he let it be l.::novm that the Ford 
!~.rotor Company would sat Lsfy the r:1a;~ or requirements of the ·'~·.:ot or Code. He stated that he would file wa:;e and hour reports 
'· 
/ror the 1-T. R. A. with the Automobile Cha1:1ber •.:f Coi!r'J.erce. With 
lfr'egard to the collective bar .. ;aining r>aragraph of lihe code, he 
~~is pat ~hed a stat euent to strikers at his Ed:;;ev;:.! te r, Hew Jersey 
!(plant declaring tha. t most of their demands had already been met, 
i 
1 ~nd J.Jromi:.::ed to raise vtages as soon as conditions l)ermitted. 
! 
j 
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The strikers ~t EdJevater were, by no means, satisfied 
:1ith this statement and pointed out that to cite H. H. A. 
col1ectitre bar;ainin:; clause was one thing, to subscribe to it, 
3nother. Callin3 a meetin~, they denounced Ur. Ford's utatement 
l~s evasive,. and dec;1nred they would prosecute the char:;es they 
1ad filed against the Ford Company v;i th the lYational Labor Board. 
i~'h2 t oame day, r,:r. Ford tool{: steps to com~)ly with the Automobile 
;fade pro
1
vision Y.'hich provides for a thirty-five hour average 
~-;ark neelc. He announced that nut less than 9,000 men ·would be 
taid off each week for a seven day period, beginning the veek of 
·Jovember 13, until all had reduced their hours from ,10 to 35 by 
I 
;tTanuary 1. 
I l!. R. A. officials in Washington 11ere net reticent 
bout sllowins their concern over this action. They stated that 
thile I!r. Ford had a legal right to reduce his payroll, it was a 
liolation of the principle of the li. R. A. and General Johnson 
would be only too glad to make an exception so that 9,000 Ford 
I Hov.rever, by using the Sabine Case, Gener~l J-ohnson 
[
.workers could be kept at v1orlc. 
l,ade another attempt to chastise 1'1r. Ford. ln f.;ct, this action 
I 
!indicated that the question of personalities wao enterin~ the 
I 
I 
~ontroversy. General Johnson's first atten~t had been to have 
ib,ecretary '\lallace refuse the low bid of the Ford Dealer S2 bine, 
!put this had been frustrated by the discriminating exactness of 
·~cnptroller General 1.1cCarl. 1:ow, the purchase of 700 of the 
I 
~600 trucks v;as transferred from the c. c. c. to the ::rar 
II 
I 
11. G. 2/III 
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Department. The low bidder promptly protested that the War 
I Department was trying to change the specifications, so that the 
Ford bid could not be accepted. ·:/hether this was true or not, 
the responsibility for purchasine the 700 truc~s was handed 
back to the C. C. C. by the War Department. 
General Johnson still insisted that Dealer Sabine 
should nGt get the contract for he reasoned that Sabine was 
11 probbly11 violating the automcbile retail code because of the 
I 
ifact that he was bidding ·lo\'Jer than the list price for Ford 
I trucks. Comptroller McCarl retorted that if the dealer was 
probably" brealcing the code law, that was a matter for the courts 
1 
to decide. Since the C. c. c. needed trucks in a hurry and it 
lwas Secretary Wallace's obligation to give the contract to the 
I 
lowest responsible bidder, a contract for 818 trucks was awarded! 
to Ford Dealer Sabine, all to be delivered within six days at 
various points from Edgewater, :Nev1 Jersey to Kansas City, 
IKisoouri. Contracts for the rest of the c. c. C. trucks and I 
I for 1500 trucks for other governmental departments >~ere still 
!held up. 
I During the week of november :~o, David Lind and J.:oe 
I Levine, opera tors of the Hercules :}as aline Fi 11 ing Stations 
Inc., were made the target for the first Federal indictment 
charging violation of a permanent N. R. A. code. They were 
indicted for having worked their employees 66 hours a week, 18 
J, ours per wee~longer than the Petroleum Code allowed;· and for 
I 
~mproper posting of gasoline prices. The counsel for the 
I 
l. :.c. 9/17 
63 
I defense admitted that his clients !md not signed the code, but 
stated that a number of their competitors ·who.had, had 
immediately proceeded to violate it. His plea w~s that, in 
order to compete with them, his clients had been forced to Vlork 
their men the stated number uf hours. '£he final cutcome was 
that, during the we el{ of December 3, they pleaded guilty, :rather 
!than be called "obstructionists" and uere fined $400 out of a 
possible 013,500. 
On Decemt)er 2, Federal Jud~e Alexander Akerman of 
Tampa, Florida, handed duwn a: decisicn which affected the 
1 
1H. R. A. Yi11en several cleaners and dyers asked for a court 
larder restraining Samuel Basemore of St. Petersburg, Florida, 
lfor advertising prices lower than those in force in that trade 
~;rea, the Jud;;e refused the order on the grounds that, only the 
Federal District Attorney had the authority to appeal to the 
courts for the enforcement of the Hecovery Act; that Basemore 
I 
'7aS admittedly not en:;aged in interstate comt;erce and Congress 
i 1ad no consii tut ional authority to re~ula te his business; and 
tthat if Congress claimed such authority because of a "national 
l:lmercency", such a r)ernicicus doctrine v1ould upset the 
::!onstitution. 
Donald Richberg, counsel of the 1T. R. A., did not 
1esit:ote to point out that .Judge Akermnn's rer;ln.rl:s on the 
alleged unconstitutionality of the Hecovery Act itself did not 
1::onslitute a 
lexpres si ons 
ruling on a point of law, but were simply the 
of the jurist's personal 'Viev:. 
1. L. 6 
I 
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_On December 11, General Johnson sum~.:wned one hundred 
and fifty cleaners, pressers, and dyers to ;~shing~on for 
public hearings. '.rhese business men, meetin_; at the Chamber of 
Commerce Buildin:; in Washington becouse of the peremptory 
summons from the u. R. A. for violations of the cleanser's code 
held their hearin~ before Compliance Director Uilliam H, Davis. 
Be fore ~1earine; the com:olai nts, the dry-cleaners were read a 
decision handed d0\7n in a lTei7 Jersey State Court, l'ermitting 
the N. R. A. to enjoin a cleaner from cut~ins prices on the 
crcunds that no citizen had the ri~ht to defy his industrial 
code durin,_:; this emer:::;ency. After hearin~s the complaints, 
N. R. A. stated that it was ready to review the Code's Drice 
schedule, but, in the meantime, violators would be turned over 
to the :D'ederal Trade Commission unless they promi.aed to ;:;o and 
to abide by the rules of the code. un the ~trength of this 
promise, 50 of the smallest cuncerns agreed, among them the 
St. PetersburG prq)riet or nhom J?ederal Judge Al:err;lan, on a 
technicality, had exculpated, a fortnight before. The majority 
! of theu, large enough to hire lawyers, refused to give in. 
! 
1 V/h i le these fulminations r:e re bei n;; made, the lT. R. A. 
I 
I 
I 
!ordered a Passaic, New Jersey beautician, the owner of the New 
i 
lneal Cafe in Cincinati, and five restaurateurs from Evanston, 
! 
!!Illinois to Austin, Texas, to surrender their H. R. A. insienia 
I lbecause of violations of their code agreeuents. 
I - In spite cf these violations, many United States 
i ibusinesses were contented and satisfied in code life. For 
1!e_x_~mnle, ' I I I ' 
ij 
II 
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forty hcur week was piling up an unsold surplus. The 
Administration, recognizing the industry's seascnal slump, 
stipulated that silk stockings vrere to be made throughont the 
nation only on 7lednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. 
The })roselytes of the antomobile ind1.1.stry requested 
that its expiring code be extended to September l, 1934. 
On December 13, General Johnson a1)pointed ninety 
administrators for ninety new codes, one hundred and fifty 
being in effect. 
The Steel Industry, hor1ever, vms havin; its 
!difficulties. Durin; the month of October, the Hational Labor 
! 
I Board had settled a dis:;:;ute betvie':n the ·:reirton f>teel Company 
! 
lin ';'fest Virginia and the heads of its Em})loyees' ur~:;anbo;ation. 
i 
I The 12,000 vrorkers who had wallced out on a strike on October 12, 
jhad declared that they had been forced to join a 11 company union 11 
I 
Jv;hich did net represent tllcr:1 properl-y in collective bar,;aining. 
I [The head of the steel company declared that the em})loyees had 
! I not be en forced to SU}lpurt the com:9any union. Finally the 
!strike was settled by the Ls_bor Buarcl, -r.rith th:-o l'rovisions that 
i 
lif the worl-cers would be allowed to ccr11e back to their jobs 
~i thout interference, the stril<e would be ended imuediotely. rt 
J'VlaS also provided that the employees of the com:-"any would hold 
I 
hn election under the su:pervision· of the lTational Labor_ Board, 
I I t which t i1:1e, re1wesc nta t i ve s V/Guld be se lee ted who v1ould carry 
I 
hn collective oargaininc:; with their e1.1l1loyer. 
!I ·:rhen the Labor Board sent the 11 nrocer1v.re 11 rules during 
II -~he~we ek=o,t;..=De ceJ..l-bC-k,.,J.~~---btio,xe.,.._,.t~~c.,r.,_t,o~-.,.~.-.od.!Odl:br-=!t= 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
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IIr. 7ier, president of the' '.'fierton 2-teel Com~lany of Weirton, 
~:rost Vir,:;inia, stated that he v1as willinJ to have "non-enployen3 
names on the ballots, so that Anerican ::!ederation of .Laber's 
.f..L1alsar::.atod Iron, Steel, and Tin Worker's Union delegates 
might be e 1 ig i hl e, but he refused to re co;:;nize "e:x-emplo yees 11 • 
He also refused to abandon the se~ret 1allot in favor of the 
petition system, statinc that such prc.dedure rules would give 
outside Auerican Federation of Labor men undue advantaee .. 
"Becauoe employees lcnuv1 that tTade uni_ons :)ut restricticns upon 
their pover and interpose a check upon their plans to 
an·;ropria te proceeds that oucht to be :-aid in vmzc s, elitplo ye rs 
have concentrated every agency and force they could deploy to 
1 
crush trade •unions and to hold wor1~ers in subjectic,n". 
Therefore he notified the Labor Board that all ar1ancements wer 
ter,·:inated. At V/eirton and Clarksburg, ':Jest Virsinia, and 
Stea len ville, Chi o, at the steel v;crl-::er' s elect ions, the company 
union representatives r1ere overahelmin::;ly elected as no 
! Amal.~;arnated candidates }Jresented themselves. 
! 
! 
' 
The ~7eirton case, in eeneral, i7as important for it 
i micht serve, in the future, as a test cc1 se for the H. H. A. 
i 
llabor policies, considering the fact that the Ford case had 
i 
I • l fa1led to do so. General Johnson had Gent a teler~:carn in 
I 
i response to I.:r. '.'!eirs telling him that if lie,1.IL\7eir;J, de.).i_pcrately 
i 
lviolat:.d the agree:.ent, he VJould rec;uest the .h.ttorney-Jeneral 
I 
!to proceed against him. A~parcntly the At~orney-Jeneral was 
l 
I 
lready to have a le~al understanding, but it was understood that 
! 
fh·~--W~J lld a ~,o.i.~u~es.,t.i,Qn=OokJ:r._Ji .• ~~nut.:l~tu.ct--i-oGnad.d;:d~-===+ 
! 1. K. 1/lOI~O 
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During .Tuly, :?resident Roose•rclt had or;anized Vihat 
'.!as called the Council of Recovery. This bcdy, com:pcsed of the 
key m.en in the recuvery prc~ram, net un Tueud2y cf each '..eek, 
to discuss administrative prcblems. Lecause uf the creaticn of 
nen agencies and more administrations, it soc;n sank into 
obscurity. 
I appointed 
1·'/alker, at> 
During the weelc of DecEmJ.ber ll., i'resident Roosevelt 
at :;;ilO,OOO a year, Anaconda Copper's la·wyer, :Frank 
I .. cting Executive Director of what vms tu be called 
the :Ha ti onal Emer_;ency Council. 
l 
AccordinG to the Presidential order, Director 
!I 
::Talker's duties ·would be as follons: consclidatin;s, 
co-ordinatinc_;, and uakins more efficient and llrL·ductive the 
II 
emer~ency activities cf the Goverruaent. He ~as tc be the 
suurce of all fuctual infornation to the public uith reference 
to the variuus c;overmHental a;;encics. ·.-ralker's reprecentatives 
nere to guide the ordinary citizen tlll'UUJh the 1:m:0e of 
governr.1ental a(;encies to the :partic·ular bureau t.J.1at could 
sup·ly the relief needed. ':lalker's first mu•re YJas to hire 
as his _headquarter's assistant, Eu;ene Sheldon Leg~ett, 
~ashington cor~es:pondent for the Detroit Free ?ress. 
Durin~; the v;eck uf Decemter ~25, President Roosevelt 
added three mere u.ernbers to the l~ational 2mergency Council, 
and anncunced that U. E. C. ·would socn tal<::e 0·rer the 
enforce~ent of N. R. A's and A. A. A's provisi0ns in the local 
fields. I~s (l~. E. C.) field }:ersonnel would be c;i ven r.>alaries, 
l. G. 5 
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but as an organization, it would save the Treasury a lar_;e sum 
of money by eliminating existing overlar.ping Federal S}lecial 
agencies. 
The headquarters of ti.1e lTat i onal Elllergency Council YlGS 
in Washington, with branch offices in all the states and most 
of the counties. These local councils would as.cume the 
functions of most of the local offices ad1u.inistering the 
different Tecovery departments. In other v10rds, a county 
council would becmne the 11go-betvr_ en 11 of the :H. R. A. and the 
conswner groups, laborers, and en~loyers. In addition, the 
council was to administer and direct the rJOrk of the Farm Credit 
Administration, the Home O.-mers loan Ccrl>Grution, t~Je Civil 
~:fc·rks Administration, and part oi' the Agricultural Adjust11lent 
Administration. The one exception was to be the TI. R. A. local 
compliance beards ,-;hich would continue to function because of 
their specialized problems. 
It was finally decided that the national organi za ti on 
of the N. E. C. would consist cf the Secretaries of Agriculture, 
Co~rrerce, and L~bor; the Administrators of the ll. R. A., 
A. A. A., and F. E. R. A; the chairmen of the H. o. L. c. and 
1 
the F. C. A; and a representative of the Consumer's Cuu.ncil. 
T1is organization was to be considered as a tempurary unit to 
exist only as long as the economic ewergepay lasts. Its 
personnel in the state and local councils vere expected to serve 
without pay. President RQosevelt also issued an executive order 
desicsnating the National Labor Board as the supreme arbiter in 
1. Appendix( i) 
69 
labor diS2JUtes under the H. R. A., maldng its previuus rulinc.;s 
retroactively binding. He also extended his voluntary 
re-em})lo;yment agreeElents to Eay l, but these had lost their 
impcrtarlce because of the fac"c that by J nuary 1, about 7 OJ~ 
of the nation's workers were covered by reJular codes. 
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Conclusions and Criticisrc.s- The uutloolc for the Future 
l 13e fore makin:)' any c onclus icns abo·,2 t the E. R. A. it ~~icht be v.rell to say s:methinu about the ubiquitous gentieman 
I 
i~ho has directed this organization. General Johnson was born at 
\ 
! 
J!Fort Scott, Kansas in 1882. He '17as graduated from 'de st J?oin t in 
I 
\P-903, married a colonel's dau:~hter, and studied laY! at the 
I 
tlniversity of California. ln 1917 he helped to write and 
~dminister the Draft Law, and during the war he served on the 
j~udge Advocates Department. ln 1919 he resigned his commission 
las :Brigadier General to become vice-president, general counsel, 
~~nd asc,:istant general manager of the r.:oline Plow Comrany, and 
I 
jprganizer and chairman of the board of the I.:oline Implement 
Oompany. In 1927 he became associated with J3ernard .r.:.annes ~aruch in :I:Tevi York City, and it v;as this gentleman who referred 
lnd recommended him to .President Roosevelt. 
I 
1 "One y:ho never turned his bacl<::, but li:arched breast forvtard. 
lTever doubted clouds Y.'Ould breal<::, 
Never dre~1ed, through right ~ere worsted wrong would 
l 
triumph." 
At !)resent he may be f"und in a little cu1Ji cle on the 
lrhird floor of the Kew Department of Cor.-;.1nerce Building. He is 
fifty-one years old, but, because of a L:clc of sleep, and hard 
lark, he locks older. Usually prone to verbal llryoteclmics, he 
ii ts hunched over his deslc, listening vri th hands clasred in 
}rant c f him, or he ans\7ers quest ions, in the meantime drawing 
I 
1. E. 5/292 
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\!arrows on 
ex:plet i ve 
the pad in front of h1m, or writing his favorite 
-
11Hell 11 • His organization has grown with leaps and 
I ounds. Ylhen the lT. R. A. adr;tinistration started, it had 87 
m:ployees \"lith a half-month payroll of :)6,619.41. ln January l, 
934 it employed G, 555 :people, used 105, 000 sque:~.re feet of of:Li 
pace and met a )166,608.40 bi-monthly payroll. General 
ohnscn had gathered together 1,500,000 volunteer workers and 
peakers, issued 100,000,000 11 pieces of literature 11 and had 
Blue Eaglerposters throughout the Unit~ 
Gf the 3,000,000 Blue Ea.Gles issued, only 48 had been 
, e'roked. 'rhe lT. R. A. had won oeven out of eit;ht cases brought 
lltt;eorecouper1t1dbl·ne_c __ r_a.us13eyof code violations, while twelve more cases ~ the Hew Year 243 codes had been approved. I hat the U. R. A. had I!1ade definite prol;ress was indicated by 
Johnson's report that he had put 4,000,000 people to work, and 
ad increased the national payroll2'2,5,CQCDO,OOO in the past half 
ear. That the N. R. A. was receivinc a friendly reception was 
I rought about by Industry's realization that the days of cut 
!:throat competition and laissez-faire 1-vere over. During the last 
1·;eel<: in December, Williams. Knudson, executive vice-president 
I f General :;.:otors Corporation stated that "General 1J.otor 
orporation, Tiith the rest of the industry, sup~orts our 
lhi tesid e, Dun and Bradstreet executive, that the ner1 order vms 
e t u u on g___f_ulnfu!jiJ._QJl....l....l'Ihi_c 1] i~DJH1Ll.. \''OAl.1J.L::P-io .. 
1. 7.:. ll/ l 9 
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indestructible. \'/i thout a doubt, many chan;.:;es vrill have tc. be 
made in the future, for the li. R. A. prograr:1 is far from being 
perfect. 
One J.!roblem the l~. R. A. Tiill be confronted with, 1vill 
be that of technological unem:ploy:eent, that is, uneuployment 
which is due to improved machinery cr improved methcds of 
manufacture. The N. R. A. Codes have shortened the working 
week to thirty-five or forty hours in nearly all industries; 
yet wi t:1 out a doubt, the comrl i ca ted prob.Lem of technolo;~ ical 
unernployment has not been dealt with effectively. :Before the 
depression, the number of men en . ;a~;ed in manufacturing industrle .. 
was decreasing. For a while these people found wcrk in the I 
service industries, but because of prevailing conditions, these I 
services have been discontinued to a large extent. In many I 
cases, employers have found that they could produce more cheapl Y1 
by brinsing in new machinery. 'l'he result is tl1at even thou::;h I 
normal times shouLd return, a (:;reat part of the present array of 
1
1 
unemployed would still be out of work. The only plausible 
solution would be to produce less per individual; to shurten the~ 
i.'l hours of labor to about thirty hours a week rather than 
I 
thirty-five or forty. Then ern~ loyers v.:ho \'!ere oper::1ting at a i 
I 
!margin, would find their costs of product ion increased when t11eyl 
'Jere forced to pay men worlcing a shcrter nunber of hours, the 
sar:1e IJay as the men •:Jerking a longer day. ln many cases, these 
increases of cost would force many of them out cf business 
alto,;ether, and wculd adr; to tl1e amcunt cf unemployment, rather 
'th~~cr~e~a~s~e~u~t=·============~============~~==================~~ 
'13 
It is obvie,;us that if the jcbles0 are to be 
re-emplcyed throu;ll a shorteninc; of the v:orl~-·;;eelc, the most 
loc;ical methud e,;f procedure '::ill be a cor.1~ror:1ise by •:Jhich 
emTJlc.yers viill l<:;ar part of tlre ccst and V/orkers a }'art. 
The cot~on industry has taken a far reac~ing step in 
tryin::; to eliminate teclmulv.:;ical unm:~plcyr.1ent. Fr 0111 the time 
the Cutten Textile Code wa~ signed, it has been impcs_ible for a 
t.tanufacturer to install a ne'.'l Lischine ·;;ithcut the permissic..n of 
the code authority of that industry. This attem}_lt was made in 
order to check the instal.:.ation of ne•:: labor· savin(; machinery 
in the cotton industry until all uneDplcyed textile workers -vvere 
1-;rovidecl with jobs. Of course, this meant tlwt r;lanufacturers of 
machinery; of men em:pluycd, or hvpin_; for emplc.,yrHent in the 
machinery-mak.i.ng industries, were affected dire:~tly. This ca:.se 
is a geed examvle of one cf the difficulties the H. R. A. has 
had to contend with. It is difficult to lJJUl<:e llrc...eress in one 
direction v:ithout imlJOdinr::; it in another. 
~t is as dif:Cicult tc r::<.ll<:e observations and }:)rec.Hctic~ 
basis 
on a scientlf'ic
11 
as it is to sclve any uf the inuuediate rroblems 
I 
and posers of the r. R. A. ·:le must reme:::lwr we are traveling 
alan:; unbeaten paths, that comli tic;,n.s are affected by many 
n0t 
<leve icpments Yihich are ear>y to mear.mre. :!'or exa1aple, business 
f:. 
in ~eneral, increased frohl February tu Septeruber abuut 44~. The 
N. R. A. was not directly res~onsible for this ~ain, for a 
number of facturs had to be taken into account. Conditions 
\VE;·re bet"er in Grc;at Britia:J, ?runce, }cn~any und other 
nations as weli as in the United Ctates during theue 
~~~~~~~~~~------------~~------------------------------~ 
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~wnths. But the government did certain things which might have 
lncoura~ed an upward tendency. ~e went off the cold standard 
lhich ~ave neople the idea that prices would rise. People began 
!I - ~ -
;:to spend money, anticipating that they v;ould profit by the 
!I . 
prevailing low prices. l~nufacturers increased their production 
!~n order to profit by the low costs of production, and increased 
!j 
~heir stocks in order to have goods to sell, if the expected 
~rice rises came. 'l'he nev; adoinistration itself indicated that 
II 
a change was about to take place, a change for the betLer, which 
II 
:produced a situation favorable to letter business. 
i 
I During July, especially the latter part of July, the 
I 
~~ettering of conditions slowed up. There were weeks of 
I • I 1retrogres s 1on with occasi onalTeeks sho'.7ing practically no 
I 
,, rogress at all. There vrere indications of improver:::ent during 
1r 
ifh~ month of l!ovember, but it beca10e quite obvious that an 
~nlnterrupted advance \7aS improbable. IJc~ople became impatient, 
~xpecting miracles to be lJerformed, au0mented in their belief 
tecause of much suffering and deprivation. .l.f they had tried to 
~~nalyze the recoveries from depresHions of the r,ast, they would 
~ave discovered that upward movements have always been 
II. 1 Tl . d f b . t . . t t ilrregu ar. 1e 1n ex o us1ness ac lVl y prepared by he 
~nnalist i~dicates that from the low point of the depression of 
~~920 and 1922, it took nineteen months to return to normal 
fonditions. During seven of those nineteen months, business 
~ctivity had a temporary setback. During the minor depression 
!l r 191'1 and 1915, it took ten months to return to normal 
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renditions and two of those months showed regression. After the 
~l~epression of 1907, the period of recovery was fifteen months, 
I .nd durinz about one-half of that time business activity did not 
I 
·: ecome greater than the month previous. Another index of 
II 
~usiness conditions indicatesthat after the depression of 1893, 
~ix of the thirteen months needed to recover to nonml conditio 
rere below the normal trend. After the depression of 1896 and 
\1897, five of the fifteen months required for norrn.alcy showed 
regression. After the low point had be~n·reached du~ing the 
iilong depres:::;ion in the 1880 1 s, seven of the seventeen months 
leaded to return to normal conditions,indicated that business 
!I 
,was worse or no bet cer than in the preceding month. The low 
~~oint of the present depress ion was reached on l~rch 18, 1933. 
I . 
rlrin,; the thirty- seven weel::s following that da"te, twenty-seven 
t7eeks showed advances and thirteen ' .. eelcs showed recessions. lf 
~~~h~~ data were studied carefully, it would become clear that we 
! re making definite progress toward promised goals. Those ·who 
I 
1
expected rapid and steady improvement in business conditions as 
~ result of the N. R. A. proJr~. need have no fear or ala~, 
ito date,we have been making normal pro~ress tov;ard recovery. 
I The N. R. A. has not been free from criticism. !t has 
I 
een pointed out that the codes can provide employment for more 
r1.en only in those industries v1hose em};;loyees are working more I . 
~~·han forty hours a week, assuming that ·the codes, in _;eneral, 
trovide for a forty hour work-~eok. If the program l SUJdested 
bove(30 hour weelc) were employed, most of the industries in the 
I 
I 
.. _ 
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It has been pointed out that a reduct ion in the weclcly 
II hours of individual workers will tend in a "share tlle "" rk" 
irnovement which will place the burden of creatin:; employment 
I 
l 
i 1upon the shoulders of labor itself. This is a problem the 
I [K. R. A. must face, and I have suggested that a compromise 
! 
lbetweBn industry and labor may be rmde. 
l 
Another arc;ument is that in prosperous times a forty 
I ! hour wcrk-vleGk means that fewer GOods are produced than could 
! 
be produced. A limit must be r:tade at some point \'lhether it is 
at forty or sixty. If that limit is thirty, without a doubt, 
the unemployment problem will be decreased and there will be a 
!"reater demand for u~ouds. !O 
i 
I Another objection is that leisure time secured will be 
Jpaid for. For example, a man vmrking a 48 hour v1eek receives 
~~24, and a man whose hour week is reduced to forty hours will 
I 
lreccive only )20. This worker may desire the four dollars, 
I 
I 
Jjv'hich is a lot to him, compared with the eight hours free time. 
rhis condition would be true if the regulation of hours and 
\rvazes bec9ne a "share the vvork 11 movement, but I h8 ve tried to 
II 
11-;i ve a remedy for that. 
jl lt is a common belief that industry has funds to pay 
Lases and has refused to do so. "A com2::ilation of returns of 
II ~~80 leadin0 industriai public utility, industrial, and railroad 
ibomuanies of 1932 shewed that the majority, 61% of the total, 
ltad- deficits ag(;rega ting .';7 87, 000, 000, r;hi ell offset the net 
~refits aggregating 0682,000,000 reported by the other 39~ 
I 
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leaving a deficit balance for all of them of $105,000,000. 
Class I railroads taken alone sho·,:ed a combined net deficit of 
approximately 0153,000,000 for 1932. ln a majority of 
1 
companies, funds did not exist to pay hi.;her waJeS." Personall:l 
I do not think that the industries laclc funds. l do think that 
they lack credit which will be restored to them when confidence 
is restored. 
Another objection is that if wages are boosted before 
rises in prices, many concerns will GO bankrupt and will 
increase unemployment. This objection has pro~red to be true 
and to substantiate it, prices have increased, but wages have 
not taken as concomitan~-Y an increase as the li. R. A. has 
expected. There may be something in the state~ent that the 
industries affected have been operatinr;; on a marginal basis and 
should be eliminated from competition. 
It has been intimated that an increase in rra,~e rates 
should not be interpreted as a net increase in purchesine power, 
but simply as a shift in demand from some classes of c;oods to 
another, from a small volume of expensive commodities to a 
larger volume of inexpensive com:.odities. 
If the N. R. A. can brina about this shift in demand, 
I think that it will be ac~omplis~ing one of its purposes, that 
of givins men a living wage in order that they may purchase 
commodities. Whether the shift from profit to wages can 
accomplish much, when profits are at an extremely low point and 
new capital investment, except in public works, is close to 
1. M. 2/415 
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zero, cannot be determined ·at the present date. '.rhe vi tal 
problem is to increase the purchasing power of those men 
employed part time and of those who are unemployed. This 
cannot be done unt i1 a definite relation has been established 
betwee!l urices and the cost .Q.:( uroduction, for labor will not 
be employed until there is a profit in employing it. 
It is believed that all those .;ettine below the 
minimum will have their pay raised and will continue to be 
I 
employed. The objection to the minimum wage is that if a person 
is not worth ~~11 to .~15 a neek to an employer, the employee 
\will not be employed •. Tl1is objection rnay be eliminated by 
stating that if the minimum salary is ~'?11 a week, salaries and 
wages will be graded from that point and only those who would 
be classified at the lowest level would be willing to work for 
I that wage. In other words, the employer would have to pay 
leleven dollarllo or the work. would not be done. The minimum wage 
1 agreement does not stipulate that that wage ·will become a 
maximum too. 
In spite of ill these objections, big business is 
jbeginning to support the N. R. A. for, under the guise of 
~eliminating 11unfair practices" and stabilizing the industry, 
the N. R. A. is producine a tendency to\7ard "monopoly and high 
prices". Personally, l think there should be a check upon this 
feature, for example, the Federal Trade Conmlis:_don could serve 
as a check valve on further tendencies and developments. 
Some thing ought to be done to protect the little fellow in 
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business. The objection that the TiJidity which greater 
unionization will impose on wajes will be supplemented by even 
greater rigidity which the trade agreements will fasten on 
wholesale and retail prices, is an admission of the fact that 
there should be a non-partisan o~~anlzation which would be able 
to guide and direct these orJanlzations in making fair 
ad,Justments. If unions continue to unionize and trade 
associations organtze, we simply will have a. modified form of 
organized individualism. 
In considering the criticisms of the H. R. A·~ 'tle must 
remember there are other factors than the n. R. A. which play a 
part in regulating prices and waGes; for example, cur1~ncy 
inflation would offset hicher wage scales by raising prices, 
and conditions in Europe. would play a direct part in tffec t ing 
the monetary system. 
Granting that the H. R. A. has raade mistakes and that 
there are many provisions which deserve criticism, if the 
!following abuses are abolished, the n. R. A. will have 
!accomplished much. During the days of "rug~ed individualism" 
~orne organizations were not abo-Je spreading false statements of 
1vhe business policies and financial ratin;;s of their competitors 
;~sing price discriminations, using methods of espiona:.;e, or 
~.~aking competitive adv·antage of their rivals. Others broke 
~ontracts, confiscated patronage, property, or business not 
oelonging to them; used misleading trade n::.u:~es, commexc iulized 
products by using the names of prominent persons, used false and 
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-~isleading labels, allowed unearned discounts, made lavish free 
di stri bu t.i ons of selling accesscrie s, allov;ed certain sorvi ces 
uo one account and not another, when conditions were similar 
~sed unfair return goods policies, obtained business by threats 
or coercion, made secret rebates and settlements, offered 
cost 
tnisleading guaranties, and used selling belc·.v,.pethods along with 
tnany others. These abuses will be abolished, providing the 
people live up to the'agreements made with President Hoosevelt 
and the N. R. A. If they do not, "the sane violations of 
regulations, the same corruption and bribery, the same 
fi.nefficiency, the same stupid interference with natural economic 
(orces, the same selfish seeking after unwarranted power, the 
~arne clever evasions of the law 11 will appear in connection with 
[he N. R. AJ for in the final analysis, the N. R. A. is 
lfstablished upon the ])remise that the .;overnm.ent in the future 
s to be regula ted by men and not by laws as in the past. lf it 
r-ccom:plishes a small part of what it has set out to do, without 
doubt, the economic situation in the future will be entirely 
ifterent from what it has been in the past. lf it succeeds in 
barrying out a major part of its progra1:1, a num1)er of problems 
~r>emain unsolved. General .Johnson tells labor to unionize in one 
l
preath, and in another he tells them that they cannot strike~ 
· f the w·orkers cannot strike, will tlJ.e f<:ct that they are formed 
n unions really mean very much to them? 'fill they be able to 
~ecure better conditions and bettor uages? Can workers depend 
I 
~pon the government to sustain their demands for constantly 
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improving conditions? C8n labor afford to let political 
:;overnment look after its rights? 
.:n the other hand, can the general public afford to 
give capitalists and laborers the richt to fight out the 
question us to the conditions under which industry shall operate 
Should the goverrnnent, representing the whole reople,. allov1 the 
!superior strngth of either the capitalists or the workers decide 
lllhat the wages in an industry shall bei Would the .::;overnment 
allow Jllants to shut down and industry to be dlsor::;nnizcd 
because of a quarrel between labor and capital? These problems 
1
must be solved in the future if the present system is to 
\continue and to exist. They involve problems which refer to the 
I'J"ery nature and duties of government itself. Is business going 
:~o accept governmental regulation after this depression is over? 
1Some say that the efficacious 1:1achinery being created will 
1pec orne permanent, t lla t the benefits v1hi ch industry \7i 11 derive, 
1
-:ill create a desire for governmental re:;ulation. Others 
:~eclare that industry and business will resume their 
1
"ndividualistic activities as soon as the emer,_;ency has pasf.;ed. 
1Phillip Cabot, in a magazine article states that "terror is a 
I 
1igh emotion which rapidly exhausts itself, so that the time 
I annat be very long. The end v:ill come when individualism 
l 
reasserts itself and demands its peace time rights. 11 
Durin3 a luncheon Boston Ch2L1ber of Corrur:cerce speech on 
Ji'ebruary 13, 1934, Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School 
;J..SSerted that the executive branch of the federal goverru:tent 
1. 1!.12/14 
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could not maintain its :;resent extraordinary por!er any lonGer 
than did the legislative and judicial branches of the ;:;overnmen' 
when they enjoyed the great po\ver of the thre~ brEmhes. 
One thing is certain. If the procedures· being 
adopted are to become permanent, opportunism must be replaced b. 
a simple and clearly stated plan; other::ise the results already 
achieved will be discarded or abolished. At present, the 
lJ. R. A. is attempting to settle problems as they arise, trying 
to decide what fair Ymges, fair hours, and fair IJrices are 
\7i thout using e,ren the trial nnd error method which is one of 
the scientific ways of doinJ it. ContinuinJ as it is, the 
recovery pro~ram, as a whole, will reGult in a bureaucracy 
beyond anything we have ever known. If the era:ployers and the 
I employees fail to co-operate because of a lack of understanding 
I or for some other reason, the program will be aL ected. If 
I manufacturers in their eaJerness for business, overreach in 
I 
raisin:; prices, they may reduce consumption which 11ill tend to 
defeat the purpose of the N. R. A. The attitude of a small 
percentage of manufacturers who are undersellin_; or "chiseling 11 
and are not supporting the :!}rogram may produce deleterious 
effects on the N. R. A. These concerns are com~eting with those 
·who are wholeheartedly supporting the progran, and if they are 
not checked, will menace progress. lt has been pointed out that 
there are certain manufacturers in ".7r;sllington v;ho are doin~ all 
they can to modify codes now established, in order that they· 
may become more favorable tc them, but detrimental to the 
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1.;, ndus try as a v:ho le. 
It should be recognized that it is impossible for 
many small manufacturers to c om}Jl y with all t. he requi re1ilent s of 
~he codes. This situation should be adjusted, for otherwise, 
chere will be much discontent and dissatisfacticn. For exrunr,le, 
· n Hew England, so% of the 14,700 manufacturers employ 50 
,i'/'orl<ers or less. The closing of a substantial proportion of 
~hese would work a hardship on smaller communities. 
I The organization of labor must l)e directed and 
1pontrolled, for it is a new power in inexperienced hands and 
I 
~hculd not be abused. Continual controversies should be 
~liminated as quickly as possible, for they produce embitLered 
!Peelings which lead to strikes and vlalkouts. If carried to an 
~xcess, they might defeat the entire national proJram. 
Where the :policies of the l{oose vel t adm.inis t ration 
I j7ill lead us will depend upon the actions an.d principles of 
I 
, hose v:ho are to administer in the future. lf the e:;overn .. 1ent 
I 
:~hould pass into the hands of parties representing the extre1:1e 
I ·~ight, which is doubtful, v;e rllay experience a covernwent similar 
I ~o that of fascism; or, lf the c;overnuent, exercisinc tret1endous 
~ower over industry, falls into the hands of the extreme Left, 
·hich is dubious, it may lead us into a form of comwunism. 
'resident Roosevelt is adoptin::; a. !)Olicy that is half vmy ·bet·ween 
hese two schools of thoucht. He intends, by eovernrnental 
1 uthoritJ to build a society based on capitalism and democracy. 
Ie intends to reform capitalism and, at tlle smr:e time, to insure! 
I 
~----------------------------~-----
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the welfare of the common IJeOJlle. Corruuunists, focists, and 
conservatives say that it cannot be done. The President and 
his liberal follo~ers say that it can. 
Poll ticians are either endorsing the N. R. A. program, 
or they are adcptin~ an attitude of skeptical dissent. Th0se 
who are acceptin.:s it are the most conspicuous Democrats, such 
as Senators Robert F. Wagner af Hew York, .James Francis Byrnes 
praise because of the fact that President 1-toosevelt has accepte 1 
I . 
land adopted some of their most cherished legislative notions. 
Of course the re,_;ular Repu1Jlican leaders such as 
Bertrand F. Snell, .James J!i.. Beck ·of Pennsylvania and .James 
Wadsworth are objecting to the N. R. A. These Jentlemen are 
practicing the art of 11 straddlinc", dissentin:::; stron::.;ly, but net 
indiscreetly. They are not denouncins with the usual partisan 
vigor, for it is possible that the anathema called the K. R. A. 
may work. 
The question has been raised as to whether the N. R. A. 
is really a part of the raw of the land. There are these who 
doubt that it conforms to the Constitution. ln all probability, 
the _Supreme Court will not give its judgment as to its 
constitutionality until a case of violation is appealed from one 
of the lov1er courts. When that case is a}>pealed, the advocr;ttes 
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Ccinstitution; for Coneress has only such powers as are granted 
expressly by the Constitution, including, ho~ever, such powers 
as may be reasonably implied from those expressly conferred. 
A power must be found which authorizes Con:;re~~s to 
abolish child labor, establish maximum hours of labor, fix 
minimum rates of ::_;ay, e:stablish maximum plant activity, permit 
collective bare;aininJ, to outla·:1 the 11 yellow dog" contract, to 
pro hi bit sales be lo·w cost, and other unfair trade practices; 
I 
for the lT. R. A. has dune, and is doing all these thint_js. The 
codes have effect of law to all members of any industry as nell 
subject matter vrhich is to be regulated within the power of 
~ongress; does this power viclate the fifth Amendment; and has 
rt~he lecislative pov1er of C!ongress been improperly dele;_;ated to 
~he executive? The sponsors of the H. I. R. A. profess to find 
~uthori ty for the enactment of the measure from three sources: 
~.~he preamble, Article I Section 8(1), and Article l Section 8(3) 
Jf ·the Constituticn. The preabble may be dismis~ed if the 
1 
)upreme Court decision which states that it confers no poV!er on 
'ongress is accepted. 'fhe ";senera~ v:elfare 11 pre vi~ ion is 
upposed to be a subst&ntive grant of poTier, ac~ordlng to the 
ponsors of the N. R. A; although in the past, viewing the 
I ~ederal Goverrunent as· one of enumerated pov;ers, the courts have 
nterpreted it as a specification of the purposes fur which 
wney may be a}Jpropr ia ted. 
1. L. 3 
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The Constitution says that Congress shall r1ave the 
power ''to regulate corrmierce with foreign nations, and amon:.; the 
1 
several states, and with the lndian •rribes". 'l'his clause seems 
to be the only express provisLn on which the Hational .H.ecovery 
Act can be rested unless so:~1e suprlementary authority may be 
2 
derived from the "necessary and proper" clause. Its chief 
obstacle is the Supreme Court decision that CongreS[j cannot 
condition the shipment of ,:;oods in interstate commerce upon the 
P1aintenance of prescribed standards of manufactures. Ho·wever, 
~he abandonment of this decisicn is possible and r:1ay be 
ponceivable. 
Interpreting the Constitution from a lLberal point of 
t;iew, one method of regulatinG corm.terce amonc; the states would 
'Pe to prescribe operation rules for industries v1hic,l1 would 
I 
nclude price, lJ. our, and vmge reGulations; for, indirectly, the 
:"aw products of most of the factories, ohcps, and stores of the 
'mtion are affected by interstate cor:nnerce. 
It is a question, ho,-,ever, whether the Courts will 
~ttempt to regulate intrastate epterprises not competin~ with 
:soods shipped in interstate corn..-:Jerce. Administrator Jolmson 
'las freely admitted that the Federal Government will be unable to 
I 4 
!
coerce recalcitrant business in the local areas. 
1 
Another ar~ument in favor of the II. I. R. A. may be 
lthat governmental re5ul~tion of all industries is necessary, for 
if an establishment 1·;hich is not dealing vli th 
~s free frbm re3ulati~n. those who carry goods 
sould be at a disadvantage. 
1. G. 1/8 ( 3) 
2 • G • 1/8 ( 18 ) 
3. L. 2 
4. G. 7(b) 
interstate comraerj
1 
acrose state lines\ 
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Also the Courts may urge that the mechanisms of 
interstate cowaerce have depressed indu~trial standards to the 
extent that com:11erce, as it functions, is delaying recovery; 
that the ecsential motive of C on.sreBs v.:as economic 
rehabilitation, i.e., the :promotion of commerce ---; and the 
control of the standards of promotion and distribution WQS the 
means to this end. 
The advocates of the N. R. A. are also dependinG upon 
the fact that the Courts have assumed the ric;ht of the 
government to regulate business affected with a public interest. 
l 
In tb.e·Ickes· 'decisicn, the Court decided that the 
Government has an implied pov:er to 1~er11etuate itself, and v1hen 
the existance of the 0overnment is threatened during a crisis, 
the goverl'1..ment has the right to exercise that pcvTer. 
Of course, those uho oppose the rr. l. R. A. believe 
that the controlling mechanisms of the H. R. A. are not 
reasonable ways of regulating interstate commerce. Herresentati, 
• eck, during the House Debate on the Recovery Act said: 11 if the 
ourt in the face of its prior decisicns, sustains the 
constitutionality of this bill, it will have to swallow the 
2 
argest dish of crow that any crow ever swallov:ed 11 • 
The fifth ar.1endment declares that no person shall be 
eprived of life, liberty, or property without due precess of 
The fourteenth amendment states that no state shall 
anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process 
1 f law. 
l. L. 7 
2. G. 4 
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la\'.' inte.rferes unduly vlith a man's business, it is de::~riving 
nim of property v1i thout due process of lav/. For exalLlijle, in 
l 
the "Bakeshop" case the New York Court of AJ;J.:.eals declared that 
a law passed by the lec;islature of :Hew York limiting the hours 
pf employment in balceries was con:titutional. However the United 
6tates Supreme Court reversed the decision on the 5round that it 
p_nterfered · with the property rights of the o1vners of the ba!-::erie'~ 
[.rhe Court also decided that!the wcrl~ers had the prcrJerty ric;ht 
[GO make contracts to work any number vf hours fjnd tlle fixing of 
1ours of labor constituted a takin~ away of property without due 
process o·f law. 
· The codes do inte rfem vli th bus ines~;, do af:Cec t profits 
:>f property owners, and unless the Supreme Court reverses itself, 
t may decide that the u. I. R. A. takes away property without 
iue process of law. 
Those who criticize the licensinG provision of the 
') 
'·' T. I. R. A. as a denial of due· precess of law point to the Eeu 
3 
'3tate Ice Company vs Liebman case in which an Oklahoma statue 
~equiring a license from an ice businens was held invalid 
(ecause it was an attempted re:;ulation of a business not 11 
.,ffected with the public interest. The sponsors of the l:i. I. R. 
4 
~.. point to the Block vs Hirsh C.qse, by stating that durin_; the 
)mer,;ency, the l)Dlice pov1er of the ::;overrunent is more 
~omr:·rehensive, es:pecially v:hen it aPplies for a limited time. 
rhe :N. I. R. A. had to be called an emer:.;ency meaoure, rather 
~han a permanent one; othen:ise, it might never have obtai ned 
1. L. 4 
2. G. 6/I4(b) 
3. L. 5 
4. L. 1 
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Concre ss i onal aprlroval. 
Cpponents of the H. I. ;n. A. intimate that the 
Executive has as:;:umed le:.;iolative l'Oiters over -r1hich it has no 
controL From a number of court decisions, the precedent has 
been established that Congreos may confer quasi-le::;islative 
pcwers upon an administrative a~ency, providing it has 
established the primary purpose of the lezislation, and has 
demarcated the limits of the ~}QY:er delegated as fully as the 
circwnstances permit. 
The point of issue will be, net the dele;ation of 
pm·:er, but whether Con:.;ress delrlarcated the limits vdthin v1hLch 
the ?resident mi.cht act. In o.ther vrcrds, \'Jlletl1er the 
delegation is so broad as to be unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court will have to decide that question in the future. 
The enforcement of the codes is to be carried on by 
covcrn~entcl sunervision and by industrial self-re~ulation. 
1 
The Federal Trade Commission is to determine v1hether any 
transaction in or affectinG interstate or foreicn com~erce shall 
I be deemed an unfair method of competition. Also the Federal 
District Attorneys are to proceed in district courts to enjcin 
violations. Any violator of a code is to be subject to a fine 
II 
II 
of :)500 for each cffense; and e:\ch day the violation continues, 11 
3 
is de,:;r,led a separate offense. Also tl1e :r.:·residential licensi115 ! 
--1 
power Jives the Administra~ion cc~plete power over 
recalcitrant business. 
In order that all this covcrm::ental interference in 
1. ,., 6 l..:r• 
2. Ibld/I 3(c) 
3. H>id/I 3{cd 
4. Ioid/I 4(b) 
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have been established to effect regulation by industry itself. 
All this reJulation raises the question as to ~1ether 
the code authorities have the constitutional ric;ht to com:0el 
testimony. If the TI. I. R. A. jrants that power, it rnay be 
found in Section 2(a). It is a:rnumentati·re that if the President 
1 
has the power to approve codes, he also has the power to 
authorize enfcrcement ac;enci es to com-r:>e 1 unYlillin.:; testimony. 
This locic is derived from the fsct that assurance of fair 
competition depends upon the detection of code violations; 
Tihich, in turn requires thorou~h investigation cf all com"21aints 
VJhether the Administration has the constitutional ri,;ht to 
compel attendance or to malce code provisions for periodic re:r_:ort , 
and inspection ofcorpurate buGks, is dubious. The Courts may 
!decide that the ri,;hts of 11 corporate privacy" have not been 
disregarded in the provision of most of the codes that any 
"nformation that is obtained, is strictly confidential. 
In the majority of cases, industries are subr,litt.ing 
odes, not that they consent to be bound thereby, but to avoid 
2 
~he imposition of reGulation by the President. 
The blanket v:ork and naJe agreol.lent be <;ween the 
~esident and employers of the country was a voluntary one, for 
' o la1·J exicted to fcrce it Ul)on all industry and busines~. 
I owever, approval of re;ular trade cedes before January 1, 
, eleased all "partners" in JGhe subscribin:~ industry, '-'nd t11e 
reeident reserved the right to amend codes befcre and arter he 
3 
~Uoave them his a;.:pro'!al. Except in the iron and steel industry, 
I 
--------------~-------- ----------------------------------------------~---
1. G. 6/I 3(a) 
2. G. 6 I 3{d) 
3. Ibid/I lO(b) 
I. 
'! !. 
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codes are not a3reements betwel:n members, and in no caoe 
between members and the government. 
Another question of doubt is v1hether the Administrativ 
has the right to modify the Federal .Anti-Trust :.8.rJs. This 
question will also be decided by the Court'in the future. 
To comply v1ith the n. I. R. A. many states have 
amended their state anti-trust lav1s and have provided for 
enforcement of codes in purely interstate transactions. lt is 
:possible but improbable that the states v;ill ta!ce any le~nl 
action against those nho sign or actively co-operate in 
observing the N. I. R. A. 
The collective bargaining provision is the most 
1 
discussed :purticn of the Act. Donald Richberg has st::tted that 
all codes must have section 7 (a) "without any modification. The 
2 
law gives the Administration no discretion as to this." lts 
I 
I 
! 
outstanding feature is the implication that em})lo:yers must treat 
\Vi th representatives so chosen. Gena tor '1lagner says 11 the duty 
3 
of employers to bargain with their representatives is urdained'1 , 
1.7hile General .Johnson had stated that "emy;loyers cannot refuse 
to bargain about conditions of ern:ployment with the self-chosen 
4 
representatives of their workers". 
The general result of tllis clause has been that 
workmen in the "open shop" industries have attempted to 
unionize and in doing so, have helped in overcouing labor's 
phobia to courts. In the past, unions have generally bet:n on 
the defensive, defending ther:lselves againot a bill for an 
I 
6/I 7(a) --~------------·~-1~ G. 
') ....,. G. 7 (c) 
3. G. 7(g) 
4. G. 7 (e) 
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injunction, the burden of prc.cf of i"Jhich, ·was often impalpably 
against them. However labor was place~ in a favorable position 
by the Anti-Injunction Act which uas approtcd by the Senate and 
I House of Representatives in Ccnljre~' s assembled on !.:arch 23, 
r 1932. It 7/C;S enacted that no court sllculd l1:.:ve juris(1 iction 
1 to issue any restraininc; ·order or tem~:-orary or r1ermanent 
II, injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor 
l 
dispute, except as provided for in the Act. 
1 The hesitancy of the Adr:linistration in adc,ptiTIG a 
j unifcrm procedure for dealing with trade unions is commendable, 
I for the unions differ very ~idely in experience 2nd leadership, 
and the great mas of \:-:orters as yet are unaccustomen to 
or~anized 3roup action. 
On the other hand, since the _collective bar ~a ining 
clause is politically important as a plan for the self 
gave rnment of indus try, the unions should at terupt to JLake it 
as concrete as possible. 
The Coal Code has none soneth in_; in this direct ion. 
It provides for " an arbitration board to plan elections, 
2 
mediate disputes, Pnd setUe conflicts of interpretation." 
On the whole, a vast nwnber cf codes have E1issed the 
opportunity to make collective barc:;aining concrete. lt mic;ht 
I be that they }Hefcr to rely on stril:es, ev·en thou_;h Johnson has 
said that he was against them, rather than deJlending upon 
arbitration to achieve their objectives. Hovre•rer, as Johnson 
has said, "only concreteness csn cbvia te narrowing construct ion 
I 1. G. 8/70 
I .., G • 2/lf~I 5 I ..... 
l 
~ ~ 
" 
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lof the statue by the courts, and v:ill prev·ent self-favuring 
interpretation b;>' nanac;eraents of labor, and m~:,ke collective 
1 
bargaining eventually effective for industrial self-~uvernment". 
I The conflict over the issue of the constitutionality 
of the N. I. H. A. is more than a conflict ever the 
interpretation cf various clauses of che Constitution. lt is a 1 
Jccnflict betv1een two im11C.-rtant philosophies of government and 
jindustry. 
j One believes that the coverru~ent urust regulate industr 
!more closely than ever· before; that the day v1hen private 
!business could be managed as the oy;ners saw fit, has )Jassed 
lav1ay; that indus try as it is t ud.o~y in a s co ial project, not an 
I individual one • They be lie ve that only thr ou;;h c;o ve rnme ntal 
'!control, can ci'J'ilizatil-n be snved from chaos <:lnd destruction; 
land if that v;ay cannot be found under the Cunsti tution, the 
Constitution muGt be changed. 
In contrast to this liberal opinion is that of the 
conserVc'ti ve group vrhlch beli':~veo that the business man should 
have the right to handle his own business as he sees fit, with 
certain minor reGulations. ':Lhey believe that no government is 
omniscient to the extent that it is ca:pable of perfcirmln.; the 
,sigantic task of controlling industry succeGsfully. ':Lhey think 
lihat the :princi!lles cf the 11. I. R. A. threaten individual 
liberty, and they believe that they too are fi3htiru to save 
civilization. li:tny of them are sincere in their beliefs that 
the Constitution prevents encruachnents upon the ri~hts of 
1. G. 7{8) 
G. '7 {f) 
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individuals over property. 
To reassure this conservati\El element of the nation, 
Attorney General Cummings stated, in a speech made before the 
American Bar Association at Grand Rapids, l.:ichigan on 
Au:;us t 31, 1933 that, "there has not been the slight est 
fundemental departure from the order or nature of our 
government or the established order ---· Every new po':Ier 
entrused to the President has been conferred by the people, 
i 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
I' 
i 
I 
acting thr_ough their duly elected representati'Tes. The Con:'res~ 
,J II 
has neither abdicated nor shirked its ri,;hts or its duties --- I 
alteratiun in the established/Ill Yfha t is really happening is not an 
form or texture of government, but a change in the spirit and 
I 
aprolication of government--- the Constitutivn is no mere ! 
lawyer's document, but the wllole of the lration 's lifen. 
Ho matLer what the Supreme Court decides in the future i 
as to the constitutionality of theN. I. R. A., if the majorityi 
i 
of the·people of the United States are determined that our I 
I 
national government shall cc,ntrol and direct industry, any 
11'
1. 
contrary ~ecisions of the Supreme Court will be brushed aside. ~ 
Ill 'Xhis may be done by Con;_sress passi nES an act increasing the · 
number of judges. The President \70uld then appoint justices II 
I! 
I ,,,, v:ho v1culd be in favor of the lT. • R. K. This would be . I' 
11 
Considered a natural procedure for the President has the right ~~~ 
to choose men v;ho are amenable to his ~overnmental policies. il 
II 
Another method would be to tal'i:e away from the Supreme Court the :1 
I' right ·which it has assumed of declaring acts of Concress ,/ 
!I I· 
.Q o ns t i t.n_;t,_i-J21l£lJ -~2Jj_s~Lbe dD ne b¥ t_l;l_e~a.;t_jJ i ~iuiJ _o f a,_=i= 
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j; 
I 
! 
I 
I 
------ --==·-----
constitutional amendment submitted to the States. 
Just what v1ill "be dune in the future is uncertain. 
Considering that I am revieTiing the histury of events up to 
January 1, 1934, at \Jhich time the n. R. A. program is 
incapable of being judged rationally, 1 hesitate to make any 
predilections. That the future of the N. R. A. rests upon the 
people is unquestionable. Perhaps General Jo~nscn in one of 
I 
I ,, 
II 
I 
I 
\ 
~ 
II 
il 
his speeches has pointed out the keynote of the entire :N • .H.. A. '! 
program when he said: "If ever a people had their fate in their 
own hands, it is this people. The President has shewn the way, 
provided the organization, 1:.rri tten the prescription - but that 
is all that any law or any Executive can ever do for people -
eive them the chance to help themselves. 
If we take that cl'l.'lnce, the goal is already in siGht. 
If we neclect or abuse it, or permit others to do so, the 
great opportunity v1ill co by. The lbtiunal Recovery Act has 
1 
done its part. The result is up to you." 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
i 
II 
1. G. 7(h) =t== 
d 
I 
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SUMMARY 
The thesis is a chronological discussion of the 
events which have established precedents or have indicated 
~uture trends toward federal participation in the control of 
~ndustry. 
The historical background of the National Recovery 
Act, from the period of the Roman Empire to the passage of the 
Act on June 16, 1933, is presented in an attempt to show that 
[a gradual transition from the principle of "laissez faire" to 
the new principle of "robust collectivism" has taken :9lace. 
Before discussing the philosophy and provisions of 
the Act, an analysis is made of the Instant Depression; for it 
is generally agreed among authorities that the collapse of the 
economic and financial structure expedited the passage of that 
famous covenant between Government and Industry. 
The body of the thesis is a presentation of the Act 
and Codes in operation. The author has endeavored at this 
time, to p>int out the conditions which augmented and developed 
friction between the NRtional Recovery Administration and 
Industry. 
In the conclusion, generalizations are made and 
constructive criticisms are offered. A timely discussion of 
the constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
is given for that phase of the program as yet, has not been 
95B 
decided upon by the Supreme Court. The writer makes no 
predilections as to the outcome of the future for at the time 
of writing
1
the N. R. A. program is incapable of being judged 
rationally; nor has any attemnt been made to verify recent 
changes in the personnel of the National Rpcovery Anministratiom 
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NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT 
(.~blic.;No.67~73DGongress) 
(H.R. 5755) 
Appr.oved,. June,.l6 ,,_ 193,3, 11:55 a.m. 
Declaration of Policy 
Section 1. A national emergency productive of widespread 
unemilloyment and disor,;anization of industry, which burdens 
interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public vmlfare, 
and underminesthe standards of living of the American people, 
is hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the 
policy of Congress·to remove obstructions to the free flow of 
interstate and foreign cownerce which tend to diminish the 
amount thereof; and to provide for the general welfare by 
promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of 
co-operative action among trade grourJs, to induce and maintain 
united ·action of labor and management under adequate 
governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair 
competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible 
u til iza ti on of the present productive capacity of industries, 
to. avoid undue restriction of production(except as may be 
temporarily required,), to increase the consumption of industrial 
and agrt6hltu~~l ~r~ducts by'increasing purchasing power, to 
reduce· and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, 
. . . 
and 6therwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural 
resources. 
Administrative A0encies 
Sec. 2 (a) To effectuate the policy of this title, the 
President is he~~by authori~ed to establish such a~encies, to 
iv 
acr:ept and u.tilize such voluntary and uncompensated servies, to 
appoint, ,without regard to the provisions of the civil service 
:lav;s, such officers and employees, and to uti 1 ize such Federal 
oLicers and employees, and, with the consent of the State, such 
State and local officers and employees, as he may find necessary 
to prescribe their authorities, duties, respunsibilities, and 
uenure, and, without regard to the Classification Act of 1923, 
~s amende~ to fix the compensation of any officers and employees 
~o appointed. 
{b) The President riiay delegate any of his functions and 
!lowers under this title to-such officers, agents, and employees 
as he may designate or ap}Joint, and may establish an industrial 
[planning and research agency to aid in carryinG out his functiom 
~nder this title. 
(c) This title shall cease to be in effect ana any 
~gencies established hereunder shall cease to exist at the 
xpiration of two years afterthe date of enactment of this Act, 
or sooner if the President shall by proclaraation or the Congress 
shall by joint resolution declare that the emergency recognized 
by section 1 has ended • 
. Codes of Fair Competition 
Sec. 3 (a)-Upon the application to the President by one or more 
tr-ade or industrial associations or groups, the :::-resident may 
~pprove a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or 
industry or sub-division thereof, represented by the applicant 
~r applicants, if the President finds (1) that such associations 
v 
or groups impose no inequitable Estrictions on admissicn to 
!membership therein and are truly representative of such trades 
or industries or subdivisions thereof, and (2) that such code 
or codes are not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate 
or OPlHess small enterprises and will not operate to discriminatE 
against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy of this 
title: Provided, That such code or codes shall not permit 
~onopolies or monopolistic practices: Provided further, That 
1
..vhere such code or codes affect the services and vtelfare of 
~ersons engaged in other steps of the economic process, nothing 
in this section shall deprive such persons of the ri~ht to be 
heard prior to a1rproval by the President of such code or codes. 
The President may, a.s a condition of his approval of any such 
code, impose such conditions (inciuding requirements for the 
making.of reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protecticr 
of consumers, competitors, employees, and others, and in 
furtherance of the public interest, and may provide such 
exceptions to .and exemptions from the prov·isions of such code, oc 
~he President in his discretion de0ms necessary to effectuate 
the policy herein declared. 
(b) After the lPresident shall have approved any such code, 
~he provisions of such code shall be the standards of fair 
pompffiition for such trade or industry of subdivision thereof • 
... 
. f\ny violation of such standards in any transaction in or 
~ffecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be deemed an 
~nfair method of competition in comuierce within the IID aning of 
---·---
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juhe Federal Trade Comrnission Act, as amended; but nothing in 
b11is title shall be construed to impair the pov1ers of the Federa 
irrade Commission under such Act, as amended. 
(c) The several district courts of the United States are 
11ereby invested r!ith jurisdiction to }Jrevent and restrain 
riolations of any code of fair competition approved under this 
ritle; and it shall be the duty of the several district 
rttorneys of the United States, in their res)ective districts, 
hnder the direction of the Attorney General, to institute 
tproceedin·;s in equity to J)revent and restrain such violations. 
(d) Upon his o;.vn motion, or if complaint is r:nde to the 
ft'resident that abuses inimical to the public interest and 
contrary to the policy he rein declared are JHev~:~lent in any 
trade or industry or subdivision thereof, and if no code of fair 
pompeti tion therefor has theretofore been ayproved by the 
!President, the l)resident, aft;,r such rmblic notice and i.1earing 
~s he shall specify, may prescribe and approve a code of fair 
com})etition for such trade or industry or subdivision thereof, 
:1hich shall have the s::ime effect as a code of f;=~ir com:peti tion 
ppproved by the President under subsection (a) of this section. 
(e) On his own motion, or if any labor orGanization, or 
~ny trade or industrial orG~ni~ation, asoociation, or ~roup, 
lillich has comiJlied ·with the provisions of thiEJ title, shall 
[ake co~~laint to the Pres~ ~nt that any article or articles are f• in:; irupo rted tnto the Unl tecl Gtetes in substantial ~uantities 
rr increasing ratio to domeotic pruduction lJf any COllliJetitiVe 
··~ 
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article or articles or increaning ratio to domestic production 
bf any competitiv-e article or articles and on such tenus or 
llnder such conditions as to render ineffective or s.eriously to 
endan3er the maintenance of any code or agreement under this 
iti tle, the President may cause an imu.edia te i nveo tiga ti on to be 
lnade by the United States Tariff Commission, 11hich shall give 
pre cadence to investigations under this subsea t ion, and if, 
~fter such investigation and such public notice and hearing as 
1e shall specify, the President shall find the existence of such 
ff'acts, he shall, in ordertD effectuate the policy of this title, 
~irect that the article or articles concerned shall be permitted 
~ntry into the United States only upon such terms and conditions 
9.nd subject to the :payment of such fees nnd to such limitations 
·n the total quantity which may ·be imi)Orted(in the course of any 
3pecified lJerio~ or periods) as he shall find it necessary to 
:nescri qe in order thc:t the entry thereof shall not render or 
~end to render ineffective any code or a~reement made under this 
:vi tle. In order to enforce any limitations imposed on the to tal 
~uantity of imports in any specified period or periods, of any 
~rt icle. or articles under this subsection, the .Pres Ld ent may 
~>orbid the importation of such article or articles unles:; the 
mporter shall hav-e first obtained from the Secretary of the 
Preasury a license pursant to such reeula t ions as the i're sident 
iay prescribe. Upon information of any action by the President 
nder this subsection the Secretary of the Treasury shall, 
~hrough the pro]er officers, permit entry of the article or 
viii 
articles specified only upon such terms Dnd conditions and 
subject to such fees, to such limitations in the quantiT.y which 
may be imported, and to such requirements of lie ense, as. the 
president shall have directed. The decision of the President 
as to f:~1cts shall be conclusive. i~ny condition or limitation of 
entry under this subsection shall contim1e in effect until the 
President shall find and inform the Secretary of the Tnasury 
that the conditions which led to the imposition of such 
condition or limitaticn upon entry no lon~er exists. 
(f) V/hen a code of fair comr,etiticn has bec;n a:p:rnoved or 
prescribed by the Eresident under this title, any violation of 
nny provision thereof in any tr:.:nsaction in or affecting 
interstate or foreign corru.:erce shall be a miSdGmeancr and upon 
conviction thereof an offender shall be fined not mere than 
)500 for e~ch offense, and each day such violation continues 
shall be deemed a separate offense. 
Agreements and Licenses 
Sec. 4. (a) The President is authorized to enter into a;recments 
:Jith, and to :::pprove voluntary agreements between and amcnc;, 
tpersons enGa;_;ed in a trade or industry, labor organizati\ns, and 
trade or industrial organizatiGns, associations, or groups, 
relating to any trade or industry, if in his judgment such 
agre:;ments will aid in effectuating the policy of this title 
~·lith respect to transactions in or affecting interstate corm,1erce 
and 17111 be consistent with the requireL:ents of clause(2) of 
~ubsection (a) of section 3 for a code of fair·com~etition. 
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(b) ',Yhenever the President shall find tht:Jt destructive 
~age or price cutting or other activit~s contrary to the policy 
of this title are being practiced in any trade or industry or an 
subdivisicn thereof, and, afLer such public notL::e and hearing 
as he shall specify, shall find it esc,entlal to license business 
enterprises in order to make effective a cede of fair 
competition or an agreement under this title or otherw~e to 
effectuate the policy of this title, an~ shall publicly so 
f?.nnounce, no rerscn shall, after a date fixed in such 
P,nncuncement, en3age in or carry on any businesG, in or effectiQ 
interstate or forei;n com:uerce, specified in such announcement, 
~nless he shall have first obt::::ined a license issued Jmrsuant tc 
puch regulations as the President shall prescribe. '.rlle rreo ident 
~ay suspend or revoke any such license, after due not.ice and 
pp})Ortunity for hearing, for violations of the terus or 
pondi tions thereof. Any order of the President suspending or 
!revoking any such license shall be final if in accord<:mce with 
~aw. Any person who, without such a license or in violation of 
f'_ny condition thereof, carries on any such business for v1llich a 
icense is so reouired, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined 
~ot more than :)500, or imprisoned not more than six months, or 
path, and each day such 7iclat.icn continues shall be deemed a 
eparate offense. "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
2(c), this subsection shall cease tube in effect at the 
expiration of one year after the dnte of enacti:lent of this "\.ct 
or socner if the President shall by ~)rocla1:ativn or the Con;ress 
hnhall by joint resolution declare that the emer;ency reco;nized 
X 
cy section l has ended. 
;:;ec. 5. 7ihile this title is in effect(or in the case of a 
license, shile section 4 (n) is in effect) and fur sixty day~ 
thereafter, c:ny code, agreement, cr license approved, prescribed 
or issued and in effect under this title, and any action 
comrlyin~ with the provisions thereof token durin:; such :period, 
shall be exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the 
United States. 
l:othing in this Act, and no re;;ulation ~hereunder, shaLl 
jprevent an individual frcm :rmrsuinc~ the vocc1tion of manual labor 
qnd sellin~ or tr~ding the products thereof; n~ shall anything 
in this Act, or re;ulation thereunder, prevent anyone from 
~arketin~ or tradins the produce of his farm. 
Limitations Upon A;)pllcation uf Title 
Sec. 6 (a) lro trade or industrial as._ociation or JrOUl~ shall 'ne 
eli3ible to receive the benefit of the provisions of this title 
Mntil it files ·,7ith the PresicL.nt a stc;tement containin,J such 
inform.:"Jtion rsla;,;ing to the activities of the association or 
group as the ?resident shall by re~ulation prescribe. 
·(b) T:1e :)resident is authorized to prescribe rules and 
re~;ulaticns desiJncd to insure that any or_;anizaticn availing 
itself of the benefits of this title shall be truly 
re2:1resentat ivc of tl1e trade or industryor subdivision thereof 
re:presentated l)y such or·;anizntic,n. Any or ;·anization violating 
·;ny such rule or re;ulation shall cear:3e to 1)e. entitled to the 
!!Jenefits of this title. 
J 
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(c) Upon the request of the Pr2.sident, the Federal Trade 
ommission shall make such investi;;ations as may be necessary 
to enable the President to carry out the provisions of this 
itle, and for such purposes the Commission shall have all the 
owers vested in it with respect of investigations under the 
Trade Commission Act as amended. 
Jec. 7. (a)Every code of fair competiticn, agrer~ment, and licens 
pr1roved, prescribed, or is:..:ued under this title shall contain 
he following conditions: (1) That em.1Jloyees shall have the 
isht to organize and bargain collecti; ely throu,;h representati v 
f their O\'m choosing, and shsll be free from the interference, 
estraint, or coercion of emplcyers of labor, or their agents, 
the designation of such representatives or in self-or,::;anizati n 
r in other concerted activities for the purpose of al.lective 
arc;aining or other mutual aid or 1;rotection: (2) that no 
no one seeking employment shall be required as a 
ondition of employment to join any comrany union or to refrain 
rom joining, organizinG•· or asGistin6 a labor organization of 
choosing; and (3) that employers shall comply with the 
hours of labor, minimt~ rates of pay, and other 
ondi tions of emplo~ent, a})proved or prescribed by the ?residen • 
(b) The President shall, so far as practicablF;, afford 
OPPortunity to employers and employees in any trade or 
ndustry or subdivision thereof with respect to Tihich the 
onditions referred to in clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a) 
to establish by mu tuo 1 agreement, the standards as to. 
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the ma):imum hours of lar;or minimum rat<~s of pay, and such other 
condition cf em:ployiJent as mry be necesunry in such trade or 
industry or subdivision thereof to effectuate the policy of 
this title; and the standa1"cl> established in such agreements, 
nheE approved by the l:;res lden t, shall l1a ve the sar:te effect as a 
code of fair compet i.tion, appro7ecl by the President under 
subsection (a) of section 3. 
(c) ';7here no such mutual a:;reomcnt has been approved 
ty t:1e President he uay investigate the la1Jor 1;ractices, 
:policieo, ":Ia~;es, hours of labor, and conditions of emplcyment 
in such trade or industry cr·subdivision thereof; and upon the 
basis of such investigations, and after such hearin~s as the 
President finds advisable, he is authorized to prescribe a 
limit·,d code of fair competition fixing s11ch maximum hcmrs of 
labor, minimum rates of J)ay, and other conditions of omployi;tent 
in the trade or industry or subdivision thereof investigated as 
he finds to be necessary to effectuate the policy of this 
title, d1ich shall have the san~e effect as a code of fair 
crmpetiticn approved by the President under subsectibn (a) of 
section 3. The President may differentiate according to 
experience and skill of the er.1ployeeo affected and in according 
to the locality of employment; but no attempt shall be :<ade to 
introduce any classification according to the nature of the 
v:ork in vel ved which mi,;ht tend tc set a maximum as nell as a 
minimum wage. 
(c1) J.s us,-~d in this ti t1e, the term 11 pe::.son 11 includes 
•.-, '· 
,···· 
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any indi ·vidual, partnership, a: sociat.iun, trust, or corporation; 
::nd in the tenns "interstr.te" and foreign coramerce" and 
."interstate or forei::;n commerce 11 include, exceilt ·where otherwise 
I 
i 
lindica,ed, trRde or commerce among the several States and v1ith 
\forei,;n naticns, or between the DistricJc cf Culwnbia or any 
!.Ler~itory of the United ;.itntes and any 8tate, 'i'erritury, or ~~foreign nation, or betTieen any insular posoesions or other 
.olaces under the jurisdiction of the United States, or between 
~ny such possession or place and any ~tote or Territory of the 
t.Jnit d Staten cr the District cf Cc,lu;Jllia or any ·foreicn nation, 
pr VJi thin the District of Col'l..urt1:·ia cr any .:.'erri tury of any 
insular possession of other l:lace under t;he jurisdicticm of the 
~ nited Gtates. 
Ar)plication of A;;ricultural Adjustuent Act 
~ec. B.(a) This title shall not be construed to repeal or 
nodi fy any of the provisions of title l of the Act entitled 
'An Act to relieve the existinJ national economic emer~ency ·by 
ncreasing agricultural purchasint; r)v·er, to raise revenue for 
,;xt raord i nary e:xr>enses incurred by reason of such emergency, to 
provide em.:1rgency relief Yii th res~~ect to agriculturnl 
I 
ndebtedness, to 
I 
:)rovide :;:·cr the orderly liquidation of 
I . t · · 1 1 d 1 o 1 n - s t c c ~: an 
I 
banks, and fer other pur:pLses", ap;-1rrved 
:':ly 12, 1933; ancl. such title l 
I 
c~ s e.i d ' ... i~C u a:r·:~rcved I.:ay 12, 
I 
1ay for all purposes be he rea:L'te r referred to as the 
' :;ricul tural Adjustuent Act. 11 
(b) The President ua;y:, J in his ~iocreticn, in order to 
1033, 
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!avoid ccnflicts in the administration of tlle A~ricultural 
\Adjustment Act and this title, dele:;ate any cd his functions 
land powers under this title with respect to trades, industries, 
I or subdivisions thereof ~hich are en~aged in the ~ndling of 
I • 1 1 d"-'- ..!l t -1 f f any a~r1cu tv.ra commo ltJY or prouuc c 1ereo , or o · any 
competing comdodity or product thereof, to the Secretary cf 
A.:;ricul ture. 
Cil Re:;ulation 
1 Sec. ~·. (a) The President is further authorized to initiate 
I before. the Interstate Com1i1erce Comr:1issicn proceedin~s necessary 
to prescribe re~ulations to control the operati1ns of oil pipe 
\lines and to fix reasonable, coL;:ensatvry rates for the 
~-\ransportation of petroleum and its products by pipe lines, and 
the Interstate Corm.:crce Conu:.tiss i en shu ll 1..:;ran t pre fe renee to the 
hearin-._:;s snd detennination of such caces. 
(b) The President is authorized to institute proceedin~s 
to divorce from any holding COilllJany any pipe-line company 
controlled by such holding com;~any >:Jhich :PilJe-line com:;any by 
unfair practices or by e:xcrbit~,nt rates in the transportation of 
petroleum or its prGducts tends to create u moncpoly. 
(c) The President is authorized to prc11ibit the 
transrlOrta.tion in interstate and forei_;n cohl;..erce oi' petruleum 
and the pro~ucts the;eof pruduced cr withdraun from stora~e in 
:xcess c f the amc1.mt permitted to be :'ruOuced ur vli thdrav;p from 
torage by 8.TIY State lm: or v2,lid rc0ula. t ic:n cr urder prescrited 
·hereunder, by any board, commissic.n, officer~ c1r ether duly 
i 
l 
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authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of 
the President issued under the provisions of this subsection 
shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000 or 
imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both. 
Rules and Regulations 
Sec. lO(a) The President is authorized to prescribe such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes 
of this title, and fees for licenses and for filing codes of 
fair competition and agreements, and any violation of any such 
rule or regulation shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed 
$500, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both. 
(b) The President may from time to time cancel or modify 
"'B..ny order, approval, license, rule, or regulation issued under 
this title; and each agreement, code of fair competition, or 
license approved, prescribed, or issued under thistitle shall 
contain a.n express provision to that effect. 
!'' 
